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ABSTRACT 
 
The Hubris Hypothesis is grounded on a failure to adequately account for the winner’s curse, which leads 
to overbidding. Surprisingly few papers have attempted to develop a direct empirical test of the 
presence of overbidding in M&A contests. We develop two such tests in this paper. Our results strongly 
support the existence of overbidding.  
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Introduction 
 
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers1 provides a potential explanation of the observed 
negative acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) reported around M&A announcements at that 
time2. The explanation combines bidding competition and valuation error. During the takeover contest, 
bidders compete to acquire the target. The winner posts the highest bid. Because bids increase with 
assessments of value, the winning bidder generally has one of the highest valuations.  Being the winner 
indicates that other bidders have a lower valuations.  In a common value setup, which is the relevant one 
for economic goods, this is bad news for the winner. Participants to the takeover contests should 
rationally anticipate this winners’ curse and shade their bids accordingly. If they do not, the ex-post 
observed value-effect of acquiring the target may be negative because winning the contest reveals 
overbidding3,4.   
Numerous empirical papers continue to report negative acquirer CARs (see Betton et al., 2008, 
for an extensive literature review of M&A research).  But negative acquirer CARs are not unambiguous 
proof of overbidding.  Acquisition announcements deliver information not only about the transaction 
itself but also about the acquirer’s current condition and strategy. Akdogu (2011), for example, 
emphasizes that acquisitions can be undertaken as a response to competitive pressures of which the 
market is unaware prior to the bid. In such a circumstance, a negative acquirer CARs is compatible with a 
value creating transaction because, in the absence of transaction, the acquirer would have been even 
worse off.  And positive acquirer CARs are not irrefutable evidence of rational (shareholders value 
maximizing) bidding either. Even if CEOs undertake transactions that create value for their shareholders, 
1 Roll (1986) 
2 In 1986, Jensen and Ruback (1983) was the most widely-read literature review about M&A value effects. These 
authors summarize previous studies reporting negative CAR for acquirers. At that time, existing empirical studies 
had rather small samples of a few hundreds large transactions. Since then, newer investigations have been able to 
study far larger numbers of transactions (e.g., Fuller et al., 2002). These studies show that the negative acquirer 
CAR  is observed mainly when the target is a publicly traded firm.  This accords with the Hubris idea that the 
observed market price of a target is an accurate estimate of value.  
3 When the target is a publicly traded company, the established market price already represents a de facto bid, so 
an acquirer must have a valuation exceeding the market price.  Even if there is only one acquirer (in addition to the 
market), the winner’s curse could still have an impact. 
4 Overbidding may in fact find its roots either in bidder irrationality (the bidder fails to anticipate the winners’ 
curse) or in decision delegation from shareholders to CEOs, the classic agency conflict studied in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Agency conflicts potentially play a significant role in the case of M&A decisions because CEOs are 
known to be key decision makers in the acquisition decision process (Harding and Rovit, 2004). CEOs may pursue 
other goals then shareholder value maximization, e.g. private benefits (Mork et al., 1990), or simply be more risk 
averse than shareholders and seek diversification (Becker, 2006). In both cases, overbidding leads to shareholder 
value destruction. 
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they may bid so that value creation is less than optimal. For example, there might be substantial 
synergies in a particular proposed merger but the acquirer might give up too much of them to the target.  
Testing overbidding is therefore inherently challenging; this explains probably the limited number of 
empirical studies addressing the issue. 
Two studies report results pertaining directly to acquirer bidding behavior. Moeller et al. (2004), 
using a large sample of 12,023 acquisitions by public U.S. firms during the 1980 to 2001 period, report 
negative acquirer CARs for public target transactions (-1.02% over a three days event window centered 
around the announcement date) but positive acquirer CAR for private targets (1.49% over the same 
event window), both statistically significant at the 1% level. This target status effect on acquirer CAR has 
been confirmed in many subsequent empirical studies (see Betton et al., 2008).  Private targets are more 
opaque and more difficult to value (Officer et al., 2009).  According to the logic of the winner’s curse, 
acquirer CARs should therefore be more negative for private targets because valuation errors are higher.  
Thus, the Moeller et al. evidence seems inconsistent with overbidding (except if we account for the 
potential seller’s winner curse, as we argue below).  
Boone and Mulherin (2008) address directly the winners’ curse issue. The authors study the 
effect of competition and target uncertainty. They use a dataset composed of 308 takeovers from 1989 
to 1999 for which they hand collect Security Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (in particular, filing S-4 
and DEFM 14A). Information contained in these documents allows the authors to identify the sales 
process (auction versus negotiation) and to construct different measures of competition (number of 
potential bidders contacted, who signed confidentiality agreements, who made private written offers 
and who, finally, announced formal bids). Proxies of target uncertainty are the selling procedure plus a 
measure of intangible assets. Results fail to validate predictions of the winners’ curse (an inverse relation 
between acquirer CAR and either competition intensity or and target uncertainty).  The results hold after 
taking account of numerous controls and after considering the endogeneity between bidder returns and 
the choice of the sales process. 
Do the Moeller et al. (2004) and Boone and Mulherin (2008) findings close the debate about the 
presence of overbidding in takeover contest, the necessary condition for the winners’ curse to be at 
play?  We are not convinced. Positive private target acquirer CAR reported in Moeller and al. (2004) may 
be driven by several other factors. Officer (2007) emphasizes, for example, the liquidity discount that 
shareholders of private target may be willing to give up to sell their shares.  Perhaps more importantly, 
private targets could be harder for the seller to value because there is no market price for a reference.  
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Since there are usually many sellers of similar small businesses, the winner’s curse could then be 
mirrored by a seller’s curse; i.e., accepting a price that is too low.   
Boone and Mulherin (2008) provide an in-depth high quality investigation that is beyond 
reproach.  But the absence of statistical significance always raises concerns about the power of tests.  Is 
really the winners’ curse absent from the M&A market or is the sample simply too small or too specific to 
uncover it?   
Other contributions report results compatible with, or even supporting, the Hubris Hypothesis. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) study the correlation between target and total gains to discriminate 
synergy, agency and hubris motives for undertaking M&As. Using a sample of 330 tender offers from the 
1963 to 1988 period, the authors conclude that, for takeovers with positive total gains, synergy is the 
primary motive but that the results are consistent with the simultaneous existence of hubris. For 
takeovers with negative total gains, agency appears to be main the decision driver. Muller and Sirower 
(2003) develop a test designed to discriminate between disciplinary, synergy, managerial discretion and 
hubris. Using a sample of 168 mergers between large companies from 1978 to 1990, the authors find 
support for the managerial discretion and hubris hypotheses. Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) report 
evidence of overbidding in bankruptcy auctions, originating from a coalition between the impaired bank 
and the acquirer. The debate is clearly still open.  
Our paper develops two direct tests of overbidding.  The first test involves the first order 
condition (FOC) of a bidder5’s expected profit maximization. Expected profit equals the probability of a 
successful acquisition multiplied by bidder’s profit conditional on acquisition. The probability of success 
is increasing in the bid premium while profits conditional on success are decreasing in it. Shareholders’ 
value maximizing acquirers select the optimal bid premium by trading off these two effects.  Therefore, if 
the bid premium is guided by value maximization, the derivative of acquirer expected profits with 
respect to the bid premium should be in ex-post and on average equal to zero because this is the 
maximization program FOC.  
Implementing the test is however challenging for two reasons. First, the probability of success is 
not observable. Second, using the ex-post observed outcome is not an option in our case. Bids are 
chosen endogenously based on a prior assessment of success. Thus, a high bid premium could 
conceivably be positively associated ex-post with a high failure rate. We rely on two proxies for the 
probability of success. Our first proxy for success probability is based on a first stage probit model using a 
large set of publicly observable determinants. The second is a measure of the difference between the bid 
5 We adopt the bidder denomination in the paper because our sample contain successful and unsuccessful deals 
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premium and the observed price reaction around the announcement. The larger this difference, the less 
investors believe that the M&A attempt will be successful.  While we are aware that both proxies suffer 
from shortcomings, we believe that they are at a minimum positively correlated with the unobservable 
true probability of success. Our test is constructed so that the weaker are these proxies, the less likely it 
will reject rational bidding.  The test is therefore conservative. The second challenge that we have to 
address is the clearly endogenous relation between the probability of success and bidder returns, both 
being the outcome of the acquirer’s expected profit maximization program. We estimate a system of 
two simultaneous equations using the three stage least squares (3SLS) estimator to address this issue. 
Identification is possible thanks to information collected, a.o., in SEC filings (in particular, deal initiation 
and sales process). The test of the first order condition of the acquirer’s expected profit maximization is 
then a test of a cross-equation restriction evaluated at estimated coefficients.  
Our empirical results rely on a sample of 977 acquisition attempts between U.S. listed bidders 
and targets, during the period 1994 to 2007. The average deal size is USD 2,839 million. The average 
three day bidder CAR is -2.80% (strongly affected by the internet bubble period) and the average four-
week bid premiums is 38.72%, similarly to results reported in previous studies for public target takeover 
contests; see Betton et al., 2008). Ninety five percent of these acquisition attempts are eventually 
successful.  
For each observation, we compute the three day bidder CAR (using the standard market model 
as return generating process) and our two proxies of the probability of success. We collect a large set of 
previously-studied determinants of bidder CAR and success probability from the CRSP, Compustat and 
SDC databases. We complement this standard set of control variables by measures of deal initiation and 
sales process. These hand-collected SEC filing items play a central role in our testing strategy because 
they allow identification of our simultaneous equations system.  
Our results strongly reject that, on average, observed bids comply with the bidder’s expected 
profit maximization FOC. We confirm this result using two proxies of the probability of success, the two 
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator and the eight-week bid premium in place of the four-week bid 
premium. Statistical significance exceeds the 1% threshold in most tests. Our first test rejects therefore 
the value maximization bidding FOC condition and suggests a significant presence of overbidding 
behavior among bidders in takeover contests.  
 Our second test of irrational bidding is designed to overcome constraints on sample size due to 
hands collection of data and potential mis-specifications due to the unobservable nature of the 
probability of success. The test intuition is based on the information set used by bidders to determine 
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their bidding strategy. Auction theory teaches us that the fundamental determinant of the equilibrium 
bidding strategy, which condition bidder expected profits, is the bidder valuation (Krishna, 2010). In the 
M&A context, the bidder valuation is the addition of the target stand-alone value and the expected 
synergies. For listed targets, the stand-alone value is common knowledge (it is the market value 
observed when there is no likelihood of an acquisition). The driving force of the bidder’s profit is 
therefore the expected synergies. Once expected synergies are taken into account, the bid premium 
itself should contain no additional information about the bidder’s profit.  
We test this rational bidding prediction by regressing the bidder CAR (the bidder’s profit proxy) 
on the deal CAR (the deal synergies proxy) and the bid premium. If the driving force of bidder bidding 
strategy is the deal synergies, adding the bid premium to the regression should be irrelevant. We expect 
therefore the coefficient of the bid premium to be equal to zero under the rational bidding hypothesis. 
The strengths of this approach are clear. Data requirements are limited because no identification issues 
impose the use of hand-collected data to find valid instruments. Therefore, standard electronic 
databases can be used.  Moreover, we no longer require a proxy for the probability of success. The test is 
thus free of potential mis-specifications at that level. Our second approach is however exposed to the 
classical endogenous omitted variables problem. A clear example is the role of competition. The 
presence of rival bidders is clearly correlated with both deal synergies and the bid premium. The solution 
is to include many relevant control variables, but there is always the possibility that something is 
overlooked.  
Thanks to the low data requirements of our second test, we are able to gather a sample of 2,730 
completed transactions for 1986 through 2008 between U.S. listed bidders and targets, for which the 
deal size is at least USD 1 million and the bidder seeks full control of the target. The average deal size is 
USD 1,402 million, significantly lower than for our first sample. The average bidder CAR is – 1.34%, 
significantly less negative than in our first sample, as expected for a sample encompassing smaller 
transactions (see Betton et al., 2008). The average four-week bid premium is 42.48%.   
 Regressing the bidder CAR on the deal CAR and the bid premium generates a negative and highly 
significant coefficient for the bid premium variable. This is true for both definitions of the bid premium 
(four-week and eight-week bid premium). We also obtain qualitatively the same results when 
instrumenting the deal CAR with the average industry deal CAR in the same year. As a last validity check, 
we replicate our second test on the small sample used to implement our first test and obtain consistent 
results. After controlling for the value creation, bidders who increase their bid take detrimental 
decisions. The result is again consistent with the presence of overbidding.  
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 Our two tests deliver the same message: overbidding in takeover contests is not a theoretical 
construct. Bidding behavior that we observe empirically confirms clearly that the average bidder bids 
more than the amount that maximizes shareholder value.  
Finally, we provide a first exploration of the determinants of overbidding.  While collecting valid 
proxies for irrationality is difficult and beyond the scope of this paper, the literature suggests several 
proxies for agency conflicts between shareholders and CEOs. We focus on the following seven attributes 
of the bidder: (a) past performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), (b) CEO variable compensation 
(Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), (c) the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index (GIM), (d) free cash-flow 
(Jensen, 1986), (e) leverage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (f) CEO age and tenure (Yim, 2012) and (g) the 
CEO pay-slice (Bebchuk and al., 2011). In a sub-sample of 544 deals for which we are able to collect these 
attributes, we find that overbidding increases with past performance, CEO variable compensation and 
the GIM index while it decreases with leverage, CEO age and the CEO pay slice. 
 Our paper contributes to different streams of literature. The first is behavioral corporate finance. 
Roll (1986) introduced the possibility that irrational behavior could lead to poor corporate performances. 
A large body of literature developed in the wake of this intuition. In the M&A field, the setup of the Roll 
(1986) paper, Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), Malmendier and Tate 
(2008), Aktas et al. (2014) study respectively the role of hubris, narcissism and overconfidence. 
Overbidding behavior must be observed empirically for these psychological biases to affect acquisition 
shareholder value creation. The second research field to which our results contribute is auction theory 
and its applications. The winners’ curse has been subject to extensive analyses (Krishna, 2010). In the 
absence of overbidding behavior, its relevance could be questioned. By showing that overbidding affects 
the M&A market, a fundamental resources allocation mechanism in the economy, we confirm that the 
winner’s curse is a potential candidate to explain irrational bidding behavior here also. The third stream 
to which our paper contributes is the M&A literature itself. Value creation and its repartition between 
bidders and targets have been central issues for more than 30 years (Betton et al., 2008). Overbidding 
directly affects the sharing of values between parties, whether it originates from irrationality or agency 
conflicts. Because ex-post we observe winners of takeover contests, those who are the most likely 
bidding beyond reason, and because overbidding behavior is conceivably correlated with other bidder 
characteristics, ignoring the existence of overbidding may lead to erroneous interpretation of empirical 
findings.  
 We structure our paper in two main sections, each one dedicated to one test. We then conclude.  
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Section 1 – The bidder’s expected profit maximization 
 We first motivate our testing strategy. We then describe its implementation.  We finally report 
our results and complementary robustness checks.  
 
1.1.  Shareholders’ value maximizing bidding behavior 
 In the absence of irrational behavior and/or agency conflicts, the CEO will choose an equilibrium 
bidding strategy to acquire the target in order to maximize shareholders’ value creation. The CEO 
maximization program takes the following form: 
 max𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑑(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) = �Pr (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) × 𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)�  (1) 
 
where 𝐸( ) stands for expectation, Pr( ) for probability, 𝐸( | ) for conditional expectation and 𝐵𝑖𝑑, for 
the bid premium. The bidder’s profit is the transaction specific value creation. Success indicates that the 
deal will be completed. Synergies designate value created specifically thanks to the acquisition and any 
economic benefits that accrue to the acquirer, such as pressure put on competitors (Akdogu,2011); and 
bid is the target shareholders payment in case of success, whatever the form. The corresponding first 
order condition is: 
 
𝜕 𝐸(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡)
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑  = 𝜕Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑  ×  �𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)� + 𝜕𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑  ×  (Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)) (2) = 0 
 
 We propose to test Equation (2) as a necessary condition for shareholders’ value maximizing 
bidding behavior. The test rests on 𝜕 Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑  and 𝜕𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑 , the partial derivatives of the 
probability of success with respect to the bid and the partial derivatives of the bidder’s profit 
conditionally on successful acquisition, also with respect to the bid. These two partial derivatives need to 
be estimated. Irrational bidding originating from not taking into account the winner’s curse affects both 
the probability of success, if other bidders don’t display the same degree of irrationality, and the bid 
itself. Deviations from the Equation (2) can also be caused by agency related motives.  
We now describe our econometric specification, noting that bidder’s profit and probability of success 
are fundamentally endogenous.  
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1.2.  Econometric specification  
 The test of Equation (2) is based on the following simultaneous equations system estimation: 
 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 +  𝑎2  ×  𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑎3  × Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) +𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀1  (3) Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝑖𝑑 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3 × 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4 × 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀2  (4) 
 
where 𝜀1 and 𝜀2 are regression errors. We use the variables 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠, 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (the party who 
initiates the transaction) and 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (the form of the sales process) to meet the order conditions 
for identification. More specifically, we assume that 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 impact 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 (Antoniou et al. 
(2008) show that deal CAR and bidder CAR are indeed positively correlated). 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 will however 
affect Pr (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) only through 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡. This exclusion is supported by results reported, a.o., 
by Luo (2005). The author shows that potential acquirers observe their own CAR around M&A 
announcement and that the probability of dropping the acquisition attempt increases in case of negative 
reaction. 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 influence directly  Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠). When a firm put itself for sale, it 
is no surprise that the probability that an acquisition will effectively take place increases significantly (de 
Bodt et al., 2014). We also expect that friendly negotiations lead to completion more frequently; (Betton 
et al. (2014) show that hostility negatively impacts the probability of deal success). These two variables 
will affect 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, but our exclusion restrictions assume that it is through Pr (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) and not 
directly. Masulis and Simsir (2013) and Boone and Mulherin (2008) show in particular that, respectively, 
initiation and the sales process has no significant direct effect on bidder CAR.  
 We estimate the Equations (3) and (4) simultaneously using the 3SLS estimator (and, in 
robustness checks, 2SLS, because it is robust to potential mis-specification of one of the two equations).  
𝛼�1 is our estimate of 
𝜕𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑   6 and ?̂?1, of 𝜕 Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑 . We test then Equation (2) as the 
following cross-equations constraint: 
 
 
6 𝛼� is strictly speaking an estimate of 𝜕 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑 . Because 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 is defined as 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑, 𝛼� 
and therefore an estimate of 𝜕 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝐵𝑖𝑑
𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑 , and not 𝜕𝐸(𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠−𝐵𝑖𝑑|𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝜕 𝐵𝑖𝑑 . We the test the robustness of our 
results to conditioning the measure of bidder’s profit to deal success by rescaling bidder CAR by the probability of 
success. 
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?̂?1  × 𝐵𝚤𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡������������������� + 𝛼�1  ×  Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)���������������� = 0     (5) 
 
where 𝐵𝚤𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡�������������������  and Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)����������������  are the sample mean estimates. The test follows a 𝐶ℎ𝑖2 
distribution with 3SLS and the 𝐹𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑟 distribution with 2SLS. 
 
1.3. Variables7 
  
Bidder profit 
 Our proxy for the bidder’s profit is the classic bidder CAR. Bidder CAR are obtained using the 
market model (MM) return generating process, using as estimation window day minus 250 to day minus 
10 with respect to the announcement date and as proxy for the market index, the CRSP value weighted 
index. CAR is the sum of MM residuals over a three days event window centered on the announcement 
date.  
 
Probability of success 
 Obtaining a proxy for the probability of success is more problematic. The probability of success is 
not directly observable and the observed outcome of makes no sense as a proxy. Even if the outcome is 
conceivably correlated with the probability of success, it is fundamentally endogenous to the bid 
premium. The bidder may optimally decide to choose a large premium when there is a high probability 
of failure. Consequently, the bid premium may correlate ex-post negatively with the probability of 
success!  
 We use two proxies for the probability of success. The first one is based on estimated 
probabilities from a probit model. We follow Betton et al. (2014) and estimate the following model: 
 
Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 � 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛼2 𝑁𝑦𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑥 + 𝛼3 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟+ 𝛼4 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 + 𝛼5 52𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ +  𝛼6 𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 +  𝛼7 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟+ 𝛼8 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 +  𝛼9 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 +  𝛼10 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 + 𝛼11 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ+ 𝛼12 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼13 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛼14 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1990 +  𝛼15 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2000 �   (6) 
 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is logarithm of the target market value estimated 42 days before the announcement 
date, 𝑁𝑦𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑥 is dummy variable taking value 1 if the target is listed on the Nyse, 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 is 
average daily ratio of the target trading volume to total shares outstanding over the 52 weeks before the 
7 Appendix 1 provides the precise definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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announcement date, 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑙 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the target has a poison pill, 52𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ is the ratio of the share price 42 days before the announcement date to the share price 
maximum during the 52 weeks before the announcement date minus 42, 𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 is a dummy variable 
taking value 1 if the bidder owns shares of the target before the deal announcement, 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the bidder is a public company, 𝐻𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the bidder and the target share the same 4-digits primary SIC code, 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 is the four-
week or the eight-week (depending on the specifications) bid premium, 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 is a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the transaction is a tender offer, 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘) is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the payment is 100% cash (stock), 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if target 
management responds negatively to the acquisition proposal and 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1990 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2000) is a dummy 
variable taking value 1 if the deal is announcement during the period 1990 to 1999 (2000 to 2009). 
 To estimate Equation (6), we collect a sample of 4,299 transactions announced during the period 
1986 to 2008. The sample includes all transactions between US bidders and US listed targets, with a deal 
size above USD 1 million, for which the bidder held less than 50% before the acquisition attempt and 
more than 50% after, reported in the SDC database. Table 1 reports summary statistics by year. The end 
of the nineties M&A wave is clearly apparent as well as the mid of the 2000s. The average deal 
completion rate is 75.67% and the average four-week bid premium is 42.07% (with a corresponding 
median of 33.79%). Interestingly, the bid premium displays a decreasing trend during the second half of 
the period.  The eight-week and four-week bid premiums are very close each other. These figures are in 
line with previously reported statistics about the US M&A market activity (see Betton et al., 2008).  
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all the variables included in Equation (6) as well as a test 
of difference of means between completed and uncompleted transactions. The sample is composed of 
75.67% completed transaction (see Table 1 also), 27.77% of targets listed on the NYSE, 3.4% of targets 
with poison pills, 12.7% of cases with toeholds, 67.04% of listed bidders, 30.15% of horizontal 
transactions, 18.54% of tender offers, 41.89% of pure cash deals and 26.49% of pure stock deals and 
8.58% of transactions classified as hostile. The sample mimics other large samples of U.S. transactions 
with public targets in the existing literature (Betton et al., 2008).  The average four-week bid premium is 
42.07% (and the corresponding average eight-week bid premium is 41.37%), also consistent with figures 
reported in such samples. The ratio of the price 42 days before announcement to the 52 week maximum 
is -27.27%, an indication consistent with bidder market timing behavior (Baker et al., 2009). Tests of 
differences of means provides some interesting, but familiar, insights: the probability of deal completion 
is higher when the target is not listed on the NYSE/AMEX (smaller targets), the target has no poison pill, 
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the bidder has no toehold, the bidder is a listed firm, for horizontal deal, when payment is stock (versus 
cash), during the second decade of our sample, when the eight-week bid premium is higher (but we 
observe no statistically significant difference for the four-week bid premium), when the target share 
price is more depressed with respect to the 52 weeks highest price and when the target trading volume 
(turnover) is high. These results are consistent with previous results reported in the literature (eg., 
Betton et al., 2008; Betton et al., 2014).  
 Table 3 displays Equation (6) estimation results. Four specifications are reported: columns (1) 
and (3) report results with the four-week bid premium while columns (2) and (4), with the eight-week bid 
premium. In columns (1) and (2), the raw bid premium is used and, as robustness check, in columns (3) 
and (4), bid premiums are winsorized at the one and ninety-nine percentiles. We observe first the very 
high stability of our estimation results across the four specifications: all estimated coefficients keep their 
signs and statistical significance. The next striking result is that, while the eight-week bid premium has a 
positive and significant coefficient (as intuitively expected), the four-week bid premium coefficient is 
insignificant. The eight-week bid premium results is consistent with Betton et al. (2014), who also use an 
eight-week period to compute the premium. The difference of results between the eight-week and four-
week bid premium may be explained by information leakages and deal anticipations. Schwert (1996) 
shows in particular that, on average, investors start to anticipate the transaction as soon as 42 days 
before the official announcement. To continue the comparison with Betton et al. (2014), we get the 
same coefficient signs and statistical significance for target size, target stock exchange, target turnover, 
target poison pill (not significant in this multivariate setup), 42 days prices before announcement to 52 
weeks high prices ratio, bidder toehold, bidder status, horizontal deal, tender offer, all cash deal (not 
significant in this multivariate setup), hostility and transaction periods variables. Switching from the 
univariate (Table 2) to the multivariate (Table 3) context brings some differences. Already mentioned 
above is the loss of significance of the poison pill and all cash variables. We note also that the coefficient 
of target size becomes significant in the multivariate context and the coefficient of the target trading 
volume (turnover) switch of signs (a sign of possible colinearity with target size).  
 We use estimated coefficients from Table 3 to build our probit based proxy for the probability of 
success. 
 
Our second proxy for the probability of success is based on investors’ anticipations. We compute it in the 
following way: 
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Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑 = � 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚�      (7) 
 
where 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is computed by the same procedure as bidder CAR, except that the event window 
goes from day minus twenty to day plus one in order to parallel the computation of the four-week bid 
premium and the 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚  is either the four-week or the eight-week bid premium. Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑, used in Aktas et al. (2014), builds on the idea that the more investors are convinced 
that the probability of success is high, the higher will be the share price revision around the acquisition 
attempt announcement. Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑  suffers potentially from two biases: rumors and anticipations 
of future bid revisions (either by the initial bidder or by rival ones). We use the four-week and the eight-
week bid premium to test the potential impact of rumors. We acknowledge the possibly confounding 
influence of future bid revisions, but such anticipations are positively correlated with the probability 
that, the target will be acquired; hence, they belong in our measure from the beginning. We rescale  Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑 between 0 and 1, to be interpretable as a probability. 
 
Bid premium 
 The four-week bid premium is collected from the SDC database. The height-week bid premium is 
obtained as: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 8 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 = 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−42
− 1     (8) 
The offer price is itself collected in the SDC database and the share price, in the CRSP database. 
 
Additional control variables 
 In addition to variables included in Equation (6), we collect a large set of variables, from both 
standard electronic databases and SEC filings: 
- From the CRSP, Compustat and SDC database, we compute the bidder market value 
(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), the target CAR (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅) and the deal CAR (𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐶𝐴𝑅), our proxy for 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠, using the same return generating process, estimation window and event window as 
for bidder CAR. We add the target runup (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝) - the ratio of the target share price 
two days before the announcement date to the target share price forty-two days before it minus 
one, bidder star advisor (𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑑𝑣) - a dummy variable taking value one if the bidder 
choses as advisor one of the top six US financial advisors, ranked by the aggregate deal values of 
M&As into which these institutions were involved, the target to bidder relative size 
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(𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒), the target industry liquidity ratio (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦) - the average liquidity 
ratio (Schlingemann et al.  (2002) M&A activity index) in the SIC 4-digits target industry the year 
of the announcement date, the target and bidder industry deal CAR (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐴𝑅 and 
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐴𝑅 respectively) - the average of targets and bidders CAR for deals that occurred 
during the announcement date year in the same SIC 2-digits industry as respectively the target 
and the bidder industry and three proxies of bidder private information variation around the 
deal announcement,  𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅2 , 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑  and 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙  – 
based respectively on the residuals of the market model, the Amihud (2002) private information 
ratio and the Roll proxy for the spread (1984).  
- We collect in the SDC filings two variables: 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 and  𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. To obtain them, we 
use SEC filings DEFM 14A and S-4 for mergers and 14D for tenders offers. 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a dummy 
variable taking value one if the target initiated the transaction. We follow Boone and Mulherin 
(2007) to identify the sales process. 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 takes value one in case of one to one 
negotiation and zero in case of (formal or informal) auction.  
- We finally identify the number of bidders from the SDC and code 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 as a dummy 
variable taking value one in case of multiple bidders contests.  
 
1.4. M&A Sample  
 We test Equation (5) by collecting a sample of 977 completed and uncompleted transactions. We 
start from the sample used in Aktas et al. (2010). The initial sample covers the period 1994 to 2007 and 
contains only completed transactions. The starting 1994 year was chosen because SEC filings became 
available in the electronic EDGAR database that year and the ending year was chosen to exclude the 
2008 financial crisis. The sample was extracted from the SDC database using the following criteria: the 
bidder and the target must be US listed firms, the deal size must be at least USD 100 million, the bidder 
must old less than 50% of the target shares before the transaction and more than 50% afterwards (in 
most cases, the percentage held after completion is in fact 100%) and the four-week bid premium must 
be available in the SDC database. The combination of these criteria generates a sample of 2,006 
transactions. SEC filings collection has been possible for 1,774 transactions. This initial sample is 
complemented by a sample of uncompleted transactions, selected using the same combination of 
criteria. Transactions are considered as uncompleted if they are reported as such in the SDC database. 
We obtain the necessary SEC filings for 320 uncompleted transactions. Merging these two samples, we 
obtain therefore 2,094 transactions. We next collect the variables required for Equations (3) and (4) 
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estimation. This lead us to a sample 977 completed and uncompleted transactions. Taking into account 
the constraints imposed by hand data collection in SEC filings, this sample size compares favorably to 
sample used in many previous academic contributions.  
 Table 4 displays descriptive statistics about this sample. The M&A wave of the late nineties is 
again clearly apparent. The phenomenon is exacerbated in deal value, mega M&As being observed 
during that periods (Moeller et al., 2005). Bidder CAR are significantly negative (-2.8%), as expected for 
large transactions between listed firms (Betton et al., 2008). Target CAR are largely positive (22.6%) and 
these transactions were, on average, synergistic with an average deal CAR of 1.65%. The average four-
week bid premium is 38.89%, close to number classically reported for these kind of samples (Betton et 
al., 2008). The deal completion rate is 95%, which is significantly higher to what we observe in Table 1. 
We focus here on larger transactions (minimum deal size of USD 100 millions in place of USD 1 million) 
and we may suspect that such transactions are attempted only when the probability of completion is 
high due the costs of undertaking them. Maybe also are SEC filings in practice harder to collect for 
uncompleted transactions. 
 
1.5. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics about the set of variables used to estimate the system 
of two simultaneous equations defined by Equations (3) and (4), and statistical test of the bidder’s 
expected profit FOC introduced in Equation (5). As Table 5 list twenty-seven variables, we don’t 
comment them all and limit ourselves to a few highlights for the sake of brevity. 
 Table 5 starts by reporting statistics on CAR, already reported in Table 4, and adds the target 
runup, positive (5.66%) and highly significant. Bidder CAR are significantly lower for uncompleted 
transactions (-2.79%), as well as target runup (difference of means of -6.96%). We then turn to 
probability of success and bid premium proxies. The probability of success is somewhat lower according 
to Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑 than to Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 (respectively 71.29% and 85.90%). Both as significantly 
lower for uncompleted transactions (respectively -2.71 pp and -14,70 pp with corresponding p-values 
0.06 and 0.00).  Bid premium are close to each other (close to 40% on average). The four-week bid 
premium is significantly higher for uncompleted transactions, probably is sign of endogeneity. We find a 
higher proportion of bidders advised by so called star advisors in completed than uncompleted 
transactions. Apparently hiring a star advisors helps (but we may suspect here also endogeneity issues). 
The target to bidder relative size is 44.1%, an unusual figure (in most studies, the ratio of target to bidder 
lies between 10% to 5%), but this is a consequence of our sample selection criteria (minimum deal size of 
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USD 100 million). We also observe that the relative size of targets is far higher for uncompleted 
transactions, an indication that larger transactions are apparently more complicated to go through. 
55.68% of transaction attempts are horizontal, 24.87% are paid in cash and 38.08% in stock, 4.09% of the 
bidders hold a toehold and 3.38% are classified as hostile. Uncompleted transactions are more often 
hostile, the bidder holding a toehold in the target (a sign of hostility according to Betton et al., 2009). 
Because 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅2, 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑, 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙 are variations between the 
pre and the post announcement periods, numbers are themselves uninformative but we observe that, 
according to these three proxies of private information, the bidder level of private information decreases 
in the wake of the acquisition attempt announcement, as expected. We finally note that 40.94% of the 
transactions in our sample are initiated by the target (with a huge and significant difference between 
uncompleted (7.55%) and completed (42.86%) transactions) and that 48.00% of transactions are 
classified as negotiations (with again a huge and significant difference between uncompleted (84.91%) 
and completed (45.99%) transactions, an evidence consistent with Aktas et al. (2010) who report that 
targets going for sales by auctions are smaller).  
 
1.6. Results 
 Table 6 is organized in two panels: panel A reports results obtained using the probit based proxy 
for the probability of success Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡  while panel B uses the investors’ proxy,  Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑. In each panel, the left two columns are dedicated to results using the four-week bid 
premium and the right two columns, the eight-week bid premium. Columns (1) report estimates of 
Equation (3), in which the dependent variable is the bidder CAR while columns (2) gives Equation (4), in 
which the dependent variable  is a probability of success proxy. 
The tests in Table 6 Panel A – left two columns proxy for rejects strongly the FOC of bidder’s 
expected profit maximization with a 𝐶ℎ𝑖2 statistic of 50.3 and a p-value of 0.00. The statistic point 
estimate is negative, an indication of overbidding (the slope of the profit function is negative and 
therefore, by bidding less, the average profit would increase). The estimated coefficient of the bid 
premium is negative and highly significant in the bidder CAR regression and positive and highly 
significant in the probability of success regression, as intuitively expected. The bidder trade-off is clearly 
captured: bidding more increase the probability of doing the deal at the cost of decreasing profits in case 
of deal completion.  
These results explicitly take into account the simultaneous nature of the relation between bidder 
CAR and the probability of success, a key feature of the chosen econometric approach. Some control 
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variables also deserve comments: the deal CAR coefficient is positive and significant in the bidder CAR 
regression. Deal CAR being our measure of synergies, this shows that bidders are able to capture part of 
the created economic value. Still in the bidder CAR regression, the bidder size coefficient is positive and 
significant, while Boone and Mulherin (2008) report a negative and significant coefficient, but the 
relative size coefficient is negative and highly significant, while not being so in Boone and Mulherin 
(2008). Maybe the mechanic colinearity between these two variables explains this variation in results. 
Continuing with the bidder CAR regression, horizontal deal with a negative sign, like in Boone and 
Muhlerin (2008), stock payment, also with a negative sign, and toehold, with a positive sign. Concerning 
horizontal deal, while it is regularly reported that horizontal transactions are more synergistic (Betton et 
al., 2008), our specification controls explicitly for synergies with the inclusion of deal CAR. We capture 
thus maybe here the presence of more intense rivalry for intra-industry transactions. We note finally 
that hostile transactions are more value creating for bidder, maybe a sign of the disciplinary nature of 
these operations (but results reported in Section 2 call for caution at this level). 
In the probability of success regression, we note that the bidder CAR coefficient is positive and 
significant, a result consistent with managers listening to investors, as argued in Luo (2005). Bidder size is 
positive and significant, probably because large firms are less financially constrained. The runup variable 
coefficient is positive, an indication that more anticipated transactions are more likely to conclude 
Interestingly, the coefficient of bidder star advisor is negative and significant. This contradicts the 
univariate evidence reported in Table 5 and call for caution when analyzing the role of these financial 
institutions in the M&A market. Unsurprisingly, target industry liquidity has a positive and significant 
coefficient: the probability of success is higher in periods of active M&A market.  Horizontal and the 
stock payment dummy variables are positive and significant, a result consistent with Betton et al. (2014), 
while the toehold dummy variable is negative and significant, a result consistent with Betton et al. 
(2009). Taking a toehold is apparently interpreted as a sign of aggression (Betton et al., 2009). We note 
finally that hostility decreases the probability of success, as negotiation, results consistent with the 
univariate evidence, but that in this multivariate setup, initiation doesn’t appear to play a significant role 
anymore. 
 We obtain mostly the same results using the eight-week bid premium, as displayed in Table 6, 
Panel A, two right columns. We just note that, in the bidder CAR regression, bidder size loses significance 
while multiple bidders become significant (competition decreases bidder’s profit). In the probability of 
success regression, target industry liquidity loses significance and multiple bidders become again 
significant, with a positive coefficient this time, as expected (competition increases the probability that 
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in the end, the deal will be completed). Maybe more importantly, the bid premium coefficient is here not 
anymore different from zero, revealing perhaps that the eight-week bid premium is a noisier proxy for 
the bidder decision variable. 
 Table 6 Panel B reproduces Table 6 Panel A using our second proxy for the probability of success, 
based on investors’ beliefs, Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑 . We observe first that, once again, the FOC of bidder’s 
expected profit maximization is strongly rejected (𝐶ℎ𝑖2 statistic of 12.7 using the four-week bid premium 
and of 25.65 using the eight-week bid premium, both with a p-value of 0.00). We also observe the bidder 
trade-off is again captured: bidding more aggressively reduces bidder CAR but increase the probability of 
success (like in Table 6 Panel A, the coefficient of the bid premium using the eight-week proxy is however 
not statistically significant the probability of success regression). The third main lesson from Table 6 
Panel B is a general decrease (not to say disappearance) of statistical significance of control variable 
coefficients. Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑  is clearly a noisier proxy for the probability of success than Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡. 
We replicate Table 6 Panels A and B estimations in Appendix 2, Panels A and B, using 2SLS. While 
this estimator is less efficient, potential misspecification of one equation doesn’t contaminate 
estimations obtained for the other one. The use of 2SLS must therefore be seen as a test of robustness.  
Our results are almost unaffected by the change of estimator and, most importantly, the FOC of optimal 
bidding is again strongly rejected in all specifications. 
 We conclude from this first analysis that our empirical evidences bring strong support to the 
existence of overbidding behavior in takeover contests. 
 
Section 2 – The bidding strategy 
 We follow the same developments as in Section 1. First, we introduce the intuition on which the 
test is built. Then, we present successively the econometric specification, the variables, the sample, 
descriptive statistics and, finally, our results.  
 
2.1. Bidder’s  equilibrium  
 Takeover contests can be modeled as auctions, bidders being the set of potential acquirers 
(including in some cases the incumbent target management team) and sellers are either target 
shareholders or the target management team (depending on whether the agency relations are 
considered). Dasgupta and Hansen (2007) summarize a large body of literature in this area and the Roll 
(1986) hubris hypothesis itself builds on insights from auction theory. 
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 The natural representation of a takeover contest is an ascending open auction (or English 
auction). In such an auction, the firm is put for sale, potential acquirers start bidding at a low price and 
progressively increase their offers. The winner makes the highest bid (as in all standard actions). English 
auctions have been extensively analyzed (see Krishna, 2010). Targets are fundamentally common value 
goods (the stand-alone value of the target is the same for all potential acquirers). While the analysis of 
English auction is greatly simplified by its equivalence to second price auction in case of private goods 
(the value of the good is strictly bidder specific), the common value setup is more complex. Assuming 
symmetry of bidders, absence of budget constraint and risk neutrality, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show 
that the equilibrium bidding strategy 𝛽(. ) is a function of the signal received by the bidder about the 
value of the good and of the signals received by rival bidders having left the auction. Inferring rival 
signals is possible in the open ascending auction because bids at which the rival bidders leave are 
observable. At any time during the auction, the equilibrium bidding process is driven by the bidder’s 
value computed from these signals. The winning bidder’s profit is then the difference between the 
winner’s valuation and the second highest valuation. The Milgrom and Weber (1982) analysis makes very 
clear that the bidder’s profit is driven by valuation and that, once valuation is taken into account, if 
bidders are rational, the bidding function itself has no further information content. 
 
2.2. Econometric specification 
 We test the null hypothesis of bidder’ rational bidding behavior by running the following 
equation:  
 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1  ×  𝐵𝑖𝑑 +  𝑎2  ×  𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀1  (9) 
 
This specification deserves several comments: 
- Under the null hypothesis of rational bidding behavior, we except 𝛼1 to be equal to zero. In this 
respect, this approach parallels tests of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), in which excess 
returns are regressed on betas and other variables (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). If the CAPM 
provides a correct description of excess return behavior, nothing should be priced except the 
measure of systematic risk;  
- The absence of the probability of success on the right-hand side of Equation (9) raises the issue 
of mis-specification. We test whether our results are affected by this issue by using, in addition 
of the bidder CAR as a second proxy for bidder’s profit, the bidder CAR rescaled by the 
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probability of success. Testing bidder rational bidding behavior by estimating Equation (9) avoids 
our results to be contaminated by potential mis-specification of the probability of success model, 
needed to implement Section 1 test8. Rescaling bidder CAR by the probability of success controls 
for the potential missing variable issue that could affect Equation (9) estimation and can be seen 
as an alternative approach to the system of simultaneous equations estimation introduced in 
Section 1; 
- Another potential issue raised by Equation (9) is the underlying symmetry assumption necessary 
to derive a common equilibrium bidding function among the set of potential acquirers (see 
Section 2.1). This is a serious issue here because Equation (9) is estimated in the cross-section. 
But in practice, bidders, targets and transactions are highly heterogeneous along many 
dimensions (bidder and target sizes, competition from other potential acquirers, relatedness of 
activities, etc).  We add a long list of control variables to fight against this source of bias; 
- Our measure of synergies (deal CAR) is potentially affected by bidder specific private information 
revelation concomitant with the M&A announcement, which itself is potentially correlated with 
bidder CAR, our dependent variable. We test the robustness of our results from this respect by 
using as instrument of the deal CAR, the average industry deal CAR for transactions in the bidder 
SIC 2-digits industry the same year as the transaction under consideration. This instrument fulfills 
by definition the exclusion condition (private information revelations around transaction 
announcements are firm specific) and we test the relevance once; 
 
2.3. Variables9 
 Our first proxy for bidder profit is the same as in Section 1.3, the bidder CAR, computed the 
same way. Our second measure is the bidder CAR rescaled for the probability of success, with is the ratio 
of the bidder CAR to the probability of success. We use Pr� (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 to estimate the probability of 
success (see Section 1.3). Rescaled bidder CAR are a proxy for bidder’s profit conditional on bid success, 
as explained in footnote 5. The bid premium is again either the four-week bid premium collected in the 
SDC database or the height-week bid premium defined at Equation (8).  
 Synergies are evaluated using deal CAR, computed also as in Section 1.3. We develop in 
complement an instrument for synergies, which is obtained by following a three steps procedure: 
8 The probability of success isn’t indeed observable per se and must therefore, in some way or another, be 
estimated by a first stage model. 
9 Appendix 1 provides the precise definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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- We first collect all transactions announced in the bidder SIC 2-digits industry the year of the 
transaction under consideration (at the exclusion of the bidder’s ones);  
- We then compute for each transaction the deal CAR, using the Section 1.3 approach; 
- We finally calculate the arithmetic average of these deals CAR. 
The exclusion condition to obtain a valid instrument is by definition met. Because we are talking about 
bidder specific private information revelation, these are not cross-correlated between bidders. We 
provide evidence that the relevance condition is also fulfilled in the results section. 
  Our set of control variables include the bidder size because is a determinant of bidder profit in 
M&A transactions (Moeller et al., 2004), bidder free cash flow to control for agency conflicts (Jensen, 
1986), bidder leverage because debt is a control mechanism of the agency relation (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), bidder market to book ratio, miss-valuation potentially explaining acquisition decisions (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003), the bidder past performance (a determinant of acquisition performance according to 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), the target size, target market to book ratio and the relative size to capture 
main characteristics of the good for sale, the horizontal deal, tender offer, all cash, all stock, toehold, 
hostile deal dummy variables, because synergies (Bradley et al., 1988), mode of payment (Travlos, 1986) 
and toehold (Betton et al., 2009) are known to be important characteristics of transactions. We also add 
a measure of bidding competition, the number of firms at least as large as the bidder in the bidder SIC 4-
digits industry (large industry rivals are potential acquirer competitors during the takeover contest), a 
measure of M&A activity in the industry, the Schlingemann et al.  (2002) M&A activity index, originally 
denoted the “liquidity index” by the authors.  
 
2.4. M&A sample  
 The sample used to estimate Equation (9) is extracted from the SDC database using the following 
criteria: the period is from 1986 to 2008 (we can expand the period in this second test because there is 
no anymore need to collect SEC filings), both the bidder and the target are US listed firms, the deal value 
is at least USD 1 million, the percentage hold before transaction is below 50% and after transaction, 
100%. After collecting information for all our variables (see Section 2.3), we are left with 2,730 
transactions, tripling the sample size with respect to Section 1 test.  
 Table 7 reports descriptive statistics by year. We find the same general features as for sample 
presented in Tables 1 and 4: two M&A waves (end of nineties, mid of years two thousands), particularly 
apparent in deal value, negative bidder CAR (-1.34% on average), positive target CAR (20.68% on 
average), synergistic transactions (1.74% deal CAR on average) and an average four-week bid premium 
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slightly over 40%. This comes out without surprise, the extraction criteria between the three sample 
being very close to each other. We just note that with respect to Section 1 sample, the mean (median) 
deal value is significantly lower : USD 2,839 million (USD 601 million) for Section 1 sample versus USD 
1,402 million (USD 220 million) for Section 2 sample. Collecting SEC filings information clearly restricts 
the sample to larger transactions. Consistent with this transaction size difference, average bidder CAR 
are far more negative for Section 1 sample (-2.80%) than for Section 2 sample (-1.34%). The larger the 
transactions, the more negative the average bidder CAR (Betton et al., 2008). 
 
2.5. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 8 reports the mean, median, standard deviation and the number of transactions for 
variables used to estimate Equation (9). In comparison with Section 1 sample (Table 5), bidder CAR are 
less negative (-1.34% versus -2.80%, see also Table 7), deal CAR are comparable (1.74% versus 1.66%), 
bid premium (four-week and eight-week) are also comparable (42.48% versus 38.7% and 42.94% versus 
40.80%, respectively), bidders are, on average, slightly smaller (USD 10.2 billion versus USD 10.759 
billion) and acquire significantly smaller targets (USD 0.916 billion versus USD 1.483 billion), a 
combination of facts that impacts the average target to bidder relative size (0.31 versus 0.44). 
Proportions of all cash and all stock offers are comparable (24.80% versus 24.87% and 42.38% versus 
38.08%, respectively); Toehold are more frequent (6.78% versus 4.05%) and the proportion of hostile 
deals is also higher (4.43% versus 3.38%).   
Table 8 figures also highlight that, on average, transactions in the industry are synergistic (1.89% 
average deal CAR in the bidder industry). We note finally that the average bidder market to book ratio 
(2.10) is higher than the average target market to book ratio (1.71), an observation consistent with the 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) Q-theory of M&As but not sufficient to validate it, as argued by Rhodes-
Kropf and Robinson (2008). 
 
2.6. Results 
 We report estimation results of Equation (9) in Table 9, Panels A to E. In each Panel, columns (1) 
and (2) display results without control variables and columns (3) and (4), with control variables. In 
columns (1) and (3), the bidder CAR is the dependent variable while in columns (2) and (4), it is the 
rescaled bidder CAR.  
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 Starting with Table 9 Panel A, our baseline specification10, we observe that, without control 
variables, the coefficient of the four-week bid premium is negative and highly significant (-0.0234 with 
0.00 p-value and -0.0233 with 0.00 p-value for bidder CAR and rescaled bidder CAR, respectively). This 
result holds true with control variables, the magnitude of the coefficient being reinforced (-0.0234 for 
bidder CAR without control variables versus -0.0342 with control variables). Under rational bidding, as 
explained in Section 2.1, the coefficient of four-week bid premium should be equal to zero. This is 
strongly rejected by our results. Concerning control variables, bidder size has a positive and significant 
coefficient, like in Table 6, for bidder CAR regressions. Hostile has a negative and significant coefficient, 
in contradiction this time with results reported in Table 6. The coefficient sign inversion may be a sign of 
colinearity, endogeneity issue or simply due to the very limited number of hostile transactions that 
increase the sampling variance and calls for caution.  Other control variables play a statistically significant 
role: bidder leverage (positive), a confirmation of the role of leverage as a disciplinary devise (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), bidder market to book ratio (negative), a reminiscence of Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
results, target size (negative), a classic results (Betton et al., 2008). 
 Acquisition attempt announcements reveal information not only about the acquisition but also 
about the bidder. Private information, by definition not observable, is therefore a latent factor 
correlated to both bidder CAR and deal CAR. This endogeneity issue may affect our results. We test 
whether it is the case using a 2SLS estimator. In the first stage, the average bidder industry deal CAR is 
used to build the instrument for deal CAR and in the second stage, Table 9 Panel A is estimated again, 
using the instrument. Table 9 Panel B reports the first stage results, with and without control variables, 
using deal CAR and rescaled deal CAR. The average deal CAR bidder industry coefficient is positive and 
strongly significant in all specifications (p-values of 0.00), a result that validates the relevance condition. 
Results in Table 9 Panel C are almost unchanged with respect to Table 9 Panel A, confirming the strong 
rejection of the rational bidding behavior hypothesis. 
 We perform a final analysis in Table 9 Panel D by replicating Equation (9) estimation on Section 1 
sample. Our goal is to verify that Section 2 results are robust to a change of sample. Specifications are 
again the same as in Table 9 Panel A. The four-week bid premium coefficients are negative and highly 
significant (p-values of 0.00), rejecting one more time the rational bidding hypothesis. We note that, with 
control variables, the four-week bid premium coefficients’ magnitude is doubled, pushing them even 
farther away from their expected value under the null hypothesis of rational bidding. 
10 We use here the four-week bid premium but reproduce Table 9 Panel A in Appendix 3 with the eight-week bid 
premium. Our results are mostly unchanged. 
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 Section 3 – Overbidding determinants 
 The test of overbidding in Section 1 delivers a natural avenue to explore overbidding 
determinants.  Equation (5) can be estimated on a transaction by transaction basis, using coefficients 𝛼�1 
and ?̂?1 from Equations (3) and (4) respectively. Collecting bidder CAR and Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡 , our proxies 
for bidder profit and the probability of success (see Section 1.3), we can thereby measure of the degree 
of overbidding in each transaction.  
 The existing literature suggests several potential overbidding determinants related to agency 
conflicts and governance mechanisms: past performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), CEO variable 
compensation (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) index (GIM), free cash-
flow (Jensen, 1986), leverage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), CEO age and tenure (Yim, 2012) and the CEO 
pay-slice (Bebchuk and al., 2011). 
 Starting from the Section 1 M&A sample, we are able to collect the necessary information for a 
sub-sample of 544 deals. Table 10 displays summary statistics.  In comparison with descriptive statistics 
for Section 1, the M&A sample reported in Table 5, only the mean value of target industry liquidity 
undergoes a significant change (from 0.25 in Table 5 to 0.08 in Table 5) but its median value stays stable 
(around 0.06). The mean value of our measure of transaction by transaction overbidding, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑂𝐶, is 
negative (-0.05) and is significantly different from zero (with a p-value of 0.00, unreported). 
 Table 11 shows the results of our multivariate analyses. The results In Column (1), are limited to 
the set of variables listed above. In Column (2), we add potentially relevant variables used to estimate 
the system of two simultaneous equations defined by Equations (3) and (4). The inclusion of these 
variables also us to test the robustness of the Column (1) results to potential omitted variables.Three 
variables are significantly associated with an increase in overbidding: past performance (p-values 0.00 in 
Columns 1 and 2), variable compensation (p-value 0.04 in Column 1 and 0.03 in Columns 2) and the GIM 
index (p-value 0.09 in Column 1 and 0.03 in Column 2). These results are consistent with the existing 
literature: Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that good past performers (glamour firms) underperform in 
the long run, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) highlight the role of M&A bonuses and Gompers and al. report 
a negative relation between entrenchment and performance. Bidder leverage decreases overbidding (p-
value 0.00 in Column 1 and 0.01 in Column 2), a result consistent with leverage being an external control 
mechanism to resolve agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), as does the bidder CEO’s pay slice, 
but only marginally in Column (2) (p-value 0.06 in Column 1 and 0.10 in Column 2). Powerful CEOs 
apparently are less prone to overbid, perhaps a sign of greater abilities. 
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Conclusion 
 Behavioral corporate finance has evolved markedly during the last decades. The Hubris 
Hypothesis suggests how irrational behavior may lead to overbidding: if bidders don’t sufficiently bias 
bids downward to account for the winner’s curse, they overvalue targets.  
 Only a limited number of studies report results pertaining to overbidding in M&A. Results are 
moreover in conflict, some authors failing to find evidence of overbidding (Moeller et al., 2004; Boone 
and Mulherin, 2008), others failing to reject the absence of overbidding (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993) or even reporting results supporting overbidding (Mueller and Sirower, 2003; Eckbo and Thorburn, 
2009).  
 In this paper, we introduce two direct tests of overbidding in M&A transactions. The first rests on 
the first order condition of an acquirer’s expected profit maximization. The second relies on the 
information content of the acquirer’s equilibrium bidding function. Our results strongly support the 
presence of overbidding. We finally highlight the role of bidder past performance, bidder CEO variable 
compensation and entrenchment as overbidding exacerbating factors, while leverage and CEO power 
apparently attenuate such behavior. The question of whether overbidding is also driven by irrationality 
remains open due to the non-observability of rationality itself for large cohorts of CEOs. 
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Table 1 – Probit sample descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the M&A sample used to estimate Equation (6). The sample includes all transactions between US 
bidders and US listed targets, with a deal size above USD 1 million, for which the bidder held less than 50% before 
the acquisition attempt and more than 50% after, reported in the SDC database between 1986 and 2008. #Deals is 
the number of deals, Success is the percentage of completed transaction by year, BidPremium four-week is the bid 
premium reported in the SDC database and BidPremium eight-week is the offer price divided by the share price of 
the target 42 days before the announcement date. 
 
      BidPremium four-week BidPremium eight-week 
Year #Deals Success Mean Median Mean Median 
1986 46 26% 44.56% 44.01% 39.52% 40.35% 
1987 90 20% 36.28% 31.45% 30.44% 30.32% 
1988 124 19% 53.44% 51.03% 42.01% 38.94% 
1989 65 15% 50.38% 47.06% 42.16% 41.18% 
1990 33 24% 51.24% 41.38% 48.66% 40.97% 
1991 17 24% 57.45% 53.85% 63.74% 57.14% 
1992 10 30% 46.89% 39.45% 40.19% 38.67% 
1993 21 38% 51.45% 49.02% 37.25% 28.16% 
1994 22 41% 80.96% 63.02% 56.10% 45.53% 
1995 79 49% 40.31% 36.67% 36.47% 33.29% 
1996 74 58% 44.21% 39.30% 34.18% 31.60% 
1997 304 85% 33.52% 30.19% 34.57% 32.20% 
1998 503 84% 43.70% 33.08% 42.92% 33.33% 
1999 541 82% 49.07% 41.65% 51.79% 42.76% 
2000 445 80% 50.09% 44.80% 50.74% 42.86% 
2001 308 87% 49.56% 40.78% 52.08% 41.91% 
2002 180 81% 52.38% 37.70% 52.30% 37.18% 
2003 232 85% 41.72% 31.45% 45.82% 33.79% 
2004 216 88% 31.12% 26.35% 32.08% 25.58% 
2005 237 85% 29.17% 25.42% 29.44% 25.00% 
2006 282 83% 29.11% 24.94% 26.97% 24.16% 
2007 290 81% 31.51% 26.92% 30.03% 26.82% 
2008 180 69% 37.94% 29.34% 32.27% 26.58% 
Total 4299 76% 42.07% 33.79% 41.37% 33.33% 
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Table 2 – Probit variables descriptive statistics and test of difference of means 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables included in Equation (6), the probit model used to estimate the 
probability of acquisition attempt success (see Section 1.3), as well as a standard test of difference of means 
between completed and uncompleted transactions. The M&A sample is describe in Section 1.3 and Table 2. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Mean is for arithmetic average, Median for sample median, Stdev for standard 
deviation, t-stat for the Student statistic of the difference of means test and p-val, the corresponding probability 
under the null hypothesis of no difference. 
 
  All deals Uncompleted Completed     
Variable Mean Median Stdev #Deals Mean Mean t-stat p-val 
Deal success 75.67% 100.00% 42.91% 4,299 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Target Size 1,184.28 156.94 4,543.72 4,299 1,078.49 1,218.29 -0.87 0.39 
NyseAmex 27.77% 0.00% 44.79% 4,299 35.85% 25.18% 6.74 0.00 
Turnover 5.8053 3.6742 6.4492 4,299 5.4350 5.9243 -2.14 0.03 
PoisonPill 3.40% 0.00% 18.12% 4,299 9.75% 1.35% 13.31 0.00 
52WeeksHigh -27.27% -21.73% 22.62% 4,299 -28.70% -26.81% -2.35 0.02 
Toehold 12.70% 0.00% 33.30% 4,299 30.50% 6.98% 20.85 0.00 
ListedBidder 67.04% 100.00% 47.01% 4,299 50.86% 72.24% -13.04 0.00 
Horizontal 30.15% 0.00% 45.89% 4,299 20.84% 33.14% -7.59 0.00 
BidPremium four-
week 42.07% 33.79% 41.87% 4,299 42.58% 41.91% 0.45 0.65 
BidPremium eight-
week 41.37% 33.33% 43.48% 4,299 37.24% 42.69% -3.53 0.00 
Tender Offer 18.54% 0.00% 38.87% 4,299 15.97% 19.37% -2.46 0.01 
AllCash 41.89% 0.00% 49.34% 4,299 50.00% 39.29% 6.13 0.00 
AllStock 26.49% 0.00% 44.14% 4,299 15.97% 29.88% -8.95 0.00 
Hostile  8.58% 0.00% 28.02% 4,299 25.05% 3.29% 23.17 0.00 
Year1990 37.31% 0.00% 48.37% 4,299 35.09% 38.03% -1.71 0.09 
Year2000 55.13% 100.00% 49.74% 4,299 39.96% 60.01% -11.51 0.00 
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Table 3 – Probability of deal completion estimation results 
Table 3 displays Equation (6) estimation results, the probit model used to estimate the probability of acquisition 
attempt success (see Section 1.3). The M&A sample is describe in Section 1.3 and Table 1. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Four specifications are reported: columns (1) and (3) report results with the four-week bid premium 
while columns (2) and (4), with the eight-week bid premium. In columns (1) and (2), the raw bid premium are used 
and in columns (3) and (4), bid premium are winsorized at the one and ninety-nine percentiles. P-values are 
reported between parentheses, below coefficients. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TargetSize 0.0551 0.0605 0.0570 0.0593 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
NyseAmex -0.270 -0.267 -0.269 -0.263 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Turnover -0.00992 -0.00915 -0.00964 -0.00877 
 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.027) 
PoisonPill -0.0902 -0.0831 -0.0884 -0.0823 
 
(0.598) (0.625) (0.605) (0.628) 
52WeeksHigh 0.467 0.565 0.488 0.567 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Toehold -0.438 -0.424 -0.437 -0.424 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ListedBidder 0.317 0.310 0.314 0.306 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Horizontal 0.211 0.210 0.210 0.211 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BidPremium four-week 0.0166 
 
0.0771 
 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.179) 
 BidPremium eight-week 
 
0.181 
 
0.216 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
TenderOffer 1.011 1.006 1.003 1.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AllCash -0.0530 -0.0456 -0.0539 -0.0491 
 
(0.374) (0.446) (0.367) (0.411) 
AllStock 0.254 0.261 0.254 0.261 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile -1.121 -1.125 -1.127 -1.124 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year1990 0.989 0.992 0.990 0.993 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year2000 1.201 1.207 1.202 1.209 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
_cons -0.610 -0.688 -0.637 -0.694 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 4299 4299 4299 4299 
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Table 4 – Bidder’s expected profit maximization test – M&A Sample  
Table 4 describes the M&A sample used to estimate Equations (3) and (4) and to test Equation (5), the first-order 
condition of the bidder’s expected profit maximization. The sample composition procedure is described in Section 
1.4. We obtain a list of 977 completed and uncompleted transactions, between US listed bidders and US listed 
targets, with a deal size of at least USD 100 million. These are control transactions (for completed transactions, the 
bidder must hold less than 50% of the target shares before the transaction and more than 50% afterwards), the 
four-week bid premium must be available in the SDC database and SEC filings must contain necessary information 
to identify the deal initiator and the sales process. #Deals is the number of deals, Deal Value is reported in USD 
million, Bidder CAR, Target CAR and Deal CAR are obtained using the market model as return generating process, 
day minus 250 to day minus 10 with respect to the announcement date estimation window, the CRSP value 
weighted index as proxy for the market index and a three days event window centered around the announcement. 
The BidPremium four-week is collected in the SDC database. Completed the percentage of transactions reported as 
completed in the SDC database. 
 
Year #Deals 
Deal 
Value 
Mean 
Deal 
Value 
Median 
Bidder 
CAR 
Mean 
Target 
CAR 
Mean 
Deal 
CAR 
Mean 
Bid 
Premium 
four-week 
Mean Completed 
1994 2 4,969 4,969 4.18% 49.92% 18.33% 75.49% 100.00% 
1995 12 845 209 0.15% 30.54% 4.24% 45.89% 67.00% 
1996 16 2,767 349 -0.57% 20.23% 3.62% 29.51% 69.00% 
1997 79 1,408 557 -2.31% 14.33% 1.46% 35.58% 99.00% 
1998 139 4,579 790 -3.90% 20.68% 0.94% 41.69% 96.00% 
1999 154 2,109 623 -3.28% 28.26% 1.14% 48.94% 94.00% 
2000 99 4,249 774 -4.19% 26.44% 2.07% 51.88% 93.00% 
2001 74 2,562 742 -5.21% 22.99% -0.02% 38.12% 91.00% 
2002 37 2,444 249 -1.50% 20.55% 1.28% 33.35% 95.00% 
2003 74 1,613 422 -2.24% 24.59% 1.95% 37.85% 95.00% 
2004 83 2,607 459 -2.79% 17.04% 1.36% 25.30% 98.00% 
2005 69 4,189 715 -0.42% 20.64% 3.03% 32.20% 96.00% 
2006 75 2,952 884 -1.78% 20.74% 2.02% 29.36% 97.00% 
2007 64 1,403 806 -1.35% 25.55% 2.83% 31.34% 98.00% 
total 977 2,839 601 -2.80% 22.60% 1.66% 38.73% 94.58% 
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Table 5 – Bidder’s expected profit maximization test – Descriptive statistics  
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate the system of two simultaneous Equations (3) 
and (4) and to test Equation (5), the first-order condition of the bidder’s expected profit maximization.  The M&A 
sample is describe in Section 1.4 and Table 4. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Mean is the arithmetic average, 
Median the corresponding median, Stdev, the standard deviation of the mean. (2)-(1) reports the 
difference of means between uncompleted and completed deals and p-val, the corresponding statistical 
significance. 
 
  All deals - 977 deals 
Completed 
- 924 deals 
Uncompleted 
- 53 deals     
Variable Mean p-val Median Stdev Mean (1) Mean (2) (2)-(1) p-val 
BidderCAR -2.80% 0.00 -1.94% 9.36% -2.64% -5.43% -2.79% 0.03 
TargetCAR 22.60% 0.00 18.55% 23.24% 22.46% 24.99% 2.53% 0.44 
DealCAR 1.66% 0.00 1.12% 8.95% 1.64% 1.99% 0.35% 0.78 
TargetRunup 5.66% 0.00 4.87% 20.37% 6.04% -0.92% -6.96% 0.02 
Pr(Success)Bid 71.29% 
 
72.41% 10.26% 71.44% 68.73% -2.71% 0.06 
Pr(Succes)Probit 85.90% 
 
87.22% 9.52% 86.70% 72.00% -14.70% 0.00 
BidPremium four-week 38.73% 
 
32.92% 31.19% 38.27% 46.73% 8.46% 0.05 
BidPremium eight-week 40.83% 
 
33.89% 36.62% 40.76% 42.00% 1.24% 0.81 
BidderSize 10,759.21 
 
2,418.51 30,725.89 11,032.82 5,989.17 5043.6510 0.25 
BidderStarAdv 37.97% 
 
0.00% 48.56% 39.29% 15.09% -24.19% 0.00 
TargetSize 1,483.60 
 
356.52 4,511.14 1,491.29 1,349.62 -141.6650 0.82 
TargetIndLiquidity 0.2504 
 
0.0633 5.2138 0.2590 0.0995 -0.1595 0.83 
RelativeSize 0.4437 
 
0.1872 0.8793 0.4197 0.8616 0.4419 0.00 
Horizontal 0.5568 
 
1 0.4970 0.5649 0.4151 -0.1498 0.03 
AllCash 24.87% 
 
0.00% 43.25% 24.57% 30.19% 5.62% 0.36 
AllStock 38.08% 
 
0.00% 48.58% 38.85% 24.53% -14.32% 0.04 
Toehold 4.09% 
 
0.00% 19.83% 3.03% 22.64% 19.61% 0.00 
Hostile 3.38% 
 
0.00% 18.07% 2.16% 24.53% 22.36% 0.00 
BidderPrivateR2 0.0197 0.00 -0.0026 0.1923 0.0195 0.0235 0.0040 0.88 
BidderPrivateAmihud -0.2808 0.00 -0.3072 0.3000 -0.2875 -0.1644 0.1230 0.00 
BidderPrivateRoll -0.5583 0.01 -0.8549 6.8037 -0.4534 -2.3876 -1.9343 0.04 
Initiation 40.94% 
 
0.00% 49.20% 42.86% 7.55% -35.31% 0.00 
Negotiation 48.00% 
 
0.00% 49.99% 45.89% 84.91% 39.02% 0.00 
MultipleBidder 4.40%   0.00% 20.52% 4.65% 0.00% -4.65% 0.11 
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Table 6 – Bidder’s expected profit maximization test – 3SLS Results  
Table 6 summarizes estimation results of the system of two simultaneous equations defined at Equations (3) and 
(4) and the ensuing test of the bidder’s expected profit maximization FOC (Equation 5). Estimations are obtained 
using the 3SLS estimator. Standard-errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported between parentheses.  The 
M&A sample is describe in Section 1.4 and Table 4. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Coeff stands for coefficient 
and p-val for p-value. Chi2 is the chi-squared statistic of the cross-equation restriction defined at Equation 5 and 
FOC test, the corresponding point estimate. Panel A uses the probit based proxy for the probability of success Pr(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡and Panel B, the investors’ anticipations bid premium based (Pr�(𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝐵𝑖𝑑). The two proxies 
are defined in Section 1.3. The left Columns (1) and (2) report results using the BidPremium four-week 
and the right ones, using BidPremium eight-week. Columns (1) are dedicated to Equation (3) estimation 
(bidder CAR dependent variable) and Columns (2), to Equation (4) estimation (probability of success 
dependent variable).  
 
Panel A - 𝐏𝐫�(𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔)𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒕 
  BidPremium four-week   BidPremium eight-week   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
BidderCAR Pr(Success)probit BidderCAR Pr(Success)probit 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderCAR 
  
0.0694 (0.022) 
  
0.0790 (0.017) 
DealCAR 0.8450 (0.000) 
  
0.8300 (0.000) 
  TargetRunup 
  
0.0694 (0.000) 
  
0.0846 
 Pr(Succes)Probit 0.6660 (0.000) 
  
0.9510 (0.000) 
  Bid Premium -0.0625 (0.000) 0.0636 (0.004) -0.0602 (0.000) 0.0058 (0.432) 
BidderSize 0.0047 (0.004) 0.0047 (0.001) 0.0032 (0.122) 0.0046 (0.002) 
BidderStarAdv 
  
-0.0074 (0.032) 
  
-0.0061 (0.038) 
TargetIndLiquidity 
  
0.0006 (0.090) 
  
0.0003 (0.362) 
RelativeSize -0.0156 (0.000) 0.0023 (0.409) -0.0160 (0.000) 0.0017 (0.541) 
Horizontal -0.0169 (0.006) 0.0241 (0.000) -0.0239 (0.003) 0.0241 (0.000) 
AllStock -0.0160 (0.010) 0.0243 (0.000) -0.0211 (0.009) 0.0231 (0.000) 
Toehold 0.0594 (0.004) -0.1040 (0.000) 0.0863 (0.003) -0.1050 (0.000) 
Hostile 0.1580 (0.000) -0.2620 (0.000) 0.2260 (0.000) -0.2580 (0.000) 
BidderPrivateR2 0.0114 (0.378) -0.0245 (0.040) 0.0160 (0.316) -0.0234 (0.049) 
BidderPrivateAmihud 0.0112 (0.166) -0.0056 (0.473) 0.0137 (0.164) -0.0049 (0.529) 
BidderPrivateRoll -0.0003 (0.414) 0.0002 (0.534) -0.0003 (0.429) 0.0002 (0.520) 
Initiation 
  
-0.0009 (0.814) 
  
-0.0008 (0.820) 
Negotiation 
  
-0.0135 (0.001) 
  
-0.0095 (0.017) 
MultipleBidder -0.0104 (0.383) 0.0161 (0.158) -0.0273 (0.067) 0.0202 (0.074) 
_cons -0.6090 (0.000) 0.8090 (0.000) -0.8380 (0.000) 0.8130 (0.000) 
N 977 
 
977 
 
977 
 
977 
 FOC Test -0.0543       -0.0518       
Chi2 50.3 (0.0000)     28.59 (0.0000)     
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Panel B - 𝐏𝐫�  (𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔)𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 
  BidPremium four-week   BidPremium eight-week   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
BidderCAR Pr(Success)bid BidderCAR Pr(Success)bid 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderCAR 
  
0.0849 (0.048) 
  
0.1090 (0.017) 
DealCAR 0.8390 (0.000) 
  
0.8730 (0.000) 
  TargetRunup 
  
0.0546 (0.000) 
  
-0.0259 (0.249) 
Pr(Succes)Bid 0.5860 (0.200) 
  
-0.0015 (0.993) 
  Bid Premium -0.0658 (0.000) 0.0350 (0.001) -0.0277 (0.000) 0.0011 (0.926) 
BidderSize 0.0043 (0.149) 0.0054 (0.010) 0.0075 (0.000) 0.0014 (0.532) 
BidderStarAdv 
  
-0.0020 (0.734) 
  
-0.0074 (0.318) 
TargetIndLiquidity 
  
-0.0002 (0.583) 
  
-0.0001 (0.873) 
RelativeSize -0.0182 (0.000) 0.0066 (0.093) -0.0153 (0.000) -0.0032 (0.454) 
Horizontal 0.0079 (0.337) -0.0152 (0.021) 0.0003 (0.932) -0.0023 (0.744) 
AllStock 0.0071 (0.378) -0.0130 (0.064) 0.0006 (0.883) -0.0071 (0.349) 
Toehold -0.0201 (0.173) 0.0156 (0.360) -0.0160 (0.088) -0.0008 (0.962) 
Hostile 0.0012 (0.953) -0.0245 (0.193) -0.0217 (0.054) 0.0327 (0.112) 
BidderPrivateR2 -0.0049 (0.722) -0.0012 (0.942) -0.0103 (0.310) 0.0266 (0.147) 
BidderPrivateAmihud 0.0088 (0.346) -0.0026 (0.811) 0.0059 (0.382) 0.0171 (0.157) 
BidderPrivateRoll -0.0004 (0.300) 0.0005 (0.279) -0.0001 (0.565) -0.0006 (0.206) 
Initiation 
  
0.0058 (0.233) 
  
0.0034 (0.677) 
Negotiation 
  
-0.0066 (0.169) 
  
-0.0161 (0.677) 
MultipleBidder 0.0037 (0.772) -0.0050 (0.757) -0.0035 (0.685) -0.0095 (0.585) 
_cons -0.4650 (0.126) 0.6680 (0.000) -0.0806 (0.301) 0.4460 (0.000) 
N 977 
 
977 
 
974 
 
974 
 FOC Test -0.0479       -0.0198       
Chi2 12.7 (0.000)     25.65 (0.000)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 7 – Bidder’s bidding strategy – M&A Sample 
Table 7 presents the M&A sample used to estimate Equation (9). The sample includes transactions between US 
listed bidders and US listed targets, with a deal size above USD 1 million, for which the bidder held less than 50% 
before the acquisition and 100% afterwards, reported in the SDC database between 1994 and 2007. #Deals is the 
number of deals, Deal Value is the amount paid for the acquisition in USD million, as reported in the SDC database. 
BidderCAR, TargetCAR, DealCAR are respectively the bidder, the target and the deal CAR (variables are defined in 
Appendix 1). BidPremium four-week is the bid premium reported in the SDC database. Completed the percentage of 
transactions reported as completed in the SDC database. 
 
Year #Deals 
Deal 
Value 
Mean 
Deal 
Value 
Median 
Bidder 
CAR 
Mean 
Target 
CAR 
Mean 
Deal 
CAR 
Mean 
BidPremium 
four-week 
Mean Completed 
1986 65 429 157 1.18% 20.12% 5.20% 40.64% 72.00% 
1987 73 437 157 -0.90% 20.27% 2.94% 41.92% 63.00% 
1988 82 292 107 0.23% 20.05% 3.25% 60.89% 60.00% 
1989 63 912 135 -0.38% 17.74% 3.31% 47.09% 59.00% 
1990 24 553 68 0.17% 22.06% 3.68% 51.02% 83.00% 
1991 39 386 131 -2.00% 21.87% 0.88% 56.45% 74.00% 
1992 35 345 164 -2.09% 16.22% 0.15% 53.97% 80.00% 
1993 43 1,092 193 -1.41% 17.47% 1.31% 52.17% 74.00% 
1994 97 435 106 -0.37% 16.60% 2.10% 37.91% 77.00% 
1995 174 689 142 -0.81% 19.60% 1.97% 37.92% 83.00% 
1996 187 1,039 196 0.46% 17.53% 3.24% 36.40% 83.00% 
1997 285 967 275 -0.20% 14.90% 2.37% 37.13% 86.00% 
1998 259 1,553 231 -1.95% 18.45% 1.61% 46.06% 87.00% 
1999 271 1,847 338 -0.63% 22.62% 1.97% 50.72% 84.00% 
2000 193 3,269 310 -4.01% 22.07% 0.48% 48.27% 84.00% 
2001 173 1,136 154 -1.88% 27.03% 0.88% 45.69% 87.00% 
2002 74 1,342 146 -4.32% 29.57% -1.22% 44.39% 82.00% 
2003 100 780 150 -1.59% 23.48% 0.93% 41.87% 94.00% 
2004 117 2,486 284 -2.12% 19.34% 0.90% 32.60% 93.00% 
2005 93 3,068 405 -2.34% 18.16% 0.66% 32.75% 91.00% 
2006 96 2,081 509 -0.86% 18.01% 1.43% 29.61% 93.00% 
2007 113 1,348 587 -1.34% 26.26% 2.20% 32.95% 88.00% 
2008 74 1,800 206 -4.81% 35.62% -0.70% 44.41% 77.00% 
total 2730 1402.78 220 -1.34% 20.68% 1.74% 42.48% 83.04% 
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Table 8 – Bidder’s bidding strategy test – Descriptive statistics  
Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for variables used to estimate Equation (9).  The M&A sample is describe in 
Section 2.4 and Table 7. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Mean is the arithmetic average, Median the 
corresponding median, Stdev, the standard deviation of the mean and #Deals, the number of deals 
 
Variables Mean Median Stdev #Deals 
BidderCAR -1.34% -1.05% 9.02% 2730 
BidderCAR$ -131,580 -4,919 2,179,954 2730 
DealCAR 1.74% 1.39% 8.36% 2730 
DealCAR$ 3,234 7,087 2,199,906 2730 
BidderIndCAR 1.89% 1.36% 4.49% 2730 
BidPremium four-week 42.48% 35.28% 40.98% 2730 
BidPremium eight-week 42.94% 34.75% 43.69% 1908 
BidPremium four-week $ 294,479 43,396 1,502,160 2730 
BidPremium eight-week$ 331,785 50,141 1,757,299 1908 
Pr(Sucess)Probit 97.94% 99.44% 5.57% 2730 
BidderSize 10,200,000 1,270,772 34,300,000 2730 
BidderFreeCashFlow 0.0180 0.0291 0.1280 2730 
BidderLeverage 0.1632 0.1102 0.1663 2730 
BidderMarketToBook 2.1025 1.4194 1.8512 2730 
BidderPastPerformance 0.06% 0.04% 0.18% 2730 
Horizontal 35.46% 0.00% 47.85% 2730 
TargetSize 916,916 138,675 3,669,324 2730 
TargetMarketToBook 1.7138 1.2252 1.2942 2730 
RelativeSize 0.3169 0.1410 0.7102 2730 
TenderOffer 16.23% 0.00% 36.88% 2730 
AllCash 24.80% 0.00% 43.19% 2730 
AllStock 42.38% 0.00% 49.43% 2730 
Toehold 6.78% 0.00% 25.14% 2730 
Hostile 4.43% 0.00% 20.58% 2730 
Number of large firms in industry 15.58 3 36.64 2730 
M&A Activity Index 0.0527 0.0321 0.0669 2730 
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Table 9 – Bidder’s bidding strategy test  
Table 9 summarizes estimation results of Equation (9). Standard-errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
reported between parentheses.  The M&A sample is described in Section 2.4 and Table 7. Variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Coeff stands for coefficient and p-val for p-value. Adj-R-sq is the adjusted R square coefficient. Panel A 
reports results obtained using the four-week bid premium and the standard OLS estimator. Panels B and C are 
dedicated to estimation results using the 2SLS to instrument the DealCAR variable. In Panel B, we present the first 
stage estimation results (regression of DealCAR on Average DealCAR Bidder Industry) and in Panel C, the second 
stage results (regression of BidderCAR on the instrument).  Panel D displays results obtained using dollar CAR and 
the OLS estimator. And, finally, in Panel E, we show results obtained by estimating Equation (9) using the Section 1 
sample. 
 
Panel A – OLS Results – Bid Premium four-week  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
DealCAR 0.8800 (0.000) 
  
0.9160 (0.000) 
  DealCAR Rescaled 
  
0.8690 (0.000) 
  
0.9120 (0.000) 
BidPremium four-week -0.0234 (0.000) -0.0233 (0.000) -0.0342 (0.000) -0.0345 (0.000) 
BidderSize 
    
0.0133 (0.000) 0.0137 (0.000) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 
    
-0.0061 (0.702) -0.0072 (0.653) 
BidderLeverage 
    
0.0165 (0.049) 0.0160 (0.063) 
BidderMarketToBook 
    
-0.0013 (0.072) -0.0014 (0.069) 
BidderPastPerformance 
    
-0.2050 (0.863) -0.1910 (0.874) 
TargetSize 
    
-0.0161 (0.000) -0.0164 (0.000) 
TargetMarketToBook 
    
0.0007 (0.464) 0.0006 (0.488) 
RelativeSize 
    
0.0115 (0.273) 0.0112 (0.292) 
TenderOffer 
    
-0.0037 (0.230) -0.0022 (0.498) 
AllCash 
    
0.0029 (0.232) 0.0022 (0.386) 
AllStock 
    
0.0046 (0.044) 0.0050 (0.033) 
Toehold 
    
-0.0022 (0.645) -0.0070 (0.198) 
Hostile 
    
-0.0160 (0.003) -0.0282 (0.000) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0010 (0.615) -0.0008 (0.711) 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
    
-0.0011 (0.131) -0.0011 (0.168) 
M&A activity index 
    
-0.0107 (0.476) -0.0088 (0.571) 
_cons -0.0187 (0.000) -0.0196 (0.000) -0.0122 (0.167) -0.0144 (0.122) 
N 2,730   2,730   2,730   2,730   
adj. R-sq 65.50%   65.60%   71.40%   71.70%   
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 Panel B – 2SLS Results – Bid Premium four-week – First Stage Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  DealCAR DealCAR Rescaled DealCAR DealCAR Rescaled 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderIndCAR 0.1880 (0.000) 0.2080 (0.000) 0.1170 (0.001) 0.1280 (0.000) 
BidPremium four-week 0.0233 (0.000) 0.0241 (0.000) 0.0270 (0.000) 0.0280 (0.000) 
BidderSize 
    
-0.0115 (0.000) -0.0121 (0.000) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 
    
0.0001 (0.997) -0.0005 (0.978) 
BidderLeverage 
    
0.0287 (0.011) 0.0329 (0.006) 
BidderMarketToBook 
    
-0.0004 (0.809) -0.0001 (0.960) 
BidderPastPerformance 
    
-2.6940 (0.050) -2.8970 (0.039) 
TargetSize 
    
0.0063 (0.000) 0.0066 (0.000) 
TargetMarketToBook 
    
-0.0004 (0.836) -0.0005 (0.807) 
RelativeSize 
    
0.0034 (0.358) 0.0046 (0.307) 
TenderOffer 
    
0.0173 (0.000) 0.0167 (0.001) 
AllCash 
    
0.0170 (0.000) 0.0192 (0.000) 
AllStock 
    
-0.0053 (0.136) -0.0050 (0.190) 
Toehold 
    
0.0020 (0.739) 0.0060 (0.436) 
Hostile 
    
0.0142 (0.072) 0.0242 (0.041) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0037 (0.235) -0.0038 (0.231) 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
    
-0.0058 (0.000) -0.0061 (0.000) 
M&A activity index 
    
-0.0109 (0.659) -0.0140 (0.583) 
_cons 0.0039 (0.131) 0.0042 (0.126) 0.0923 (0.000) 0.0954 (0.000) 
N 2,730   2,730   2,730   2,730   
adj. R-sq 2.20%   2.30%   9.90%   10.70%   
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Panel C – 2SLS Results – Bid Premium four-week – Second Stage Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
DealCAR 0.8820 (0.000) 
  
1.0200 (0.000) 
  DealCAR Rescaled 
  
0.8580 (0.000) 
  
1.0230 (0.000) 
BidPremium four-week -0.0234 (0.000) -0.0231 (0.000) -0.0370 (0.000) -0.0376 (0.000) 
BidderSize 
    
0.0146 (0.000) 0.0151 (0.000) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 
    
-0.0064 (0.685) -0.0075 (0.638) 
BidderLeverage 
    
0.0133 (0.219) 0.0121 (0.291) 
BidderMarketToBook 
    
-0.0013 (0.076) -0.0014 (0.062) 
BidderPastPerformance 
    
0.0871 (0.947) 0.1450 (0.912) 
TargetSize 
    
-0.0168 (0.000) -0.0171 (0.000) 
TargetMarketToBook 
    
0.0007 (0.448) 0.0007 (0.466) 
RelativeSize 
    
0.0111 (0.276) 0.0107 (0.305) 
TenderOffer 
    
-0.0055 (0.224) -0.0041 (0.356) 
AllCash 
    
0.0011 (0.798) 0.0001 (0.990) 
AllStock 
    
0.0051 (0.036) 0.0056 (0.025) 
Toehold 
    
-0.0026 (0.592) -0.0079 (0.164) 
Hostile 
    
-0.0175 (0.007) -0.0308 (0.000) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0006 (0.777) -0.0003 (0.885) 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
    
-0.0005 (0.703) -0.0003 (0.799) 
M&A activity index 
    
-0.0098 (0.521) -0.0076 (0.636) 
_cons -0.0188 (0.000) -0.0195 (0.000) -0.0224 (0.268) -0.0257 (0.206) 
N 2,730   2,730   2,730   2,730   
adj. R-sq 65.50%   65.60%   70.60%   70.80%   
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Panel D – OLS Results – Bid Premium four-week – Section 1 Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
DealCAR 0.8250 (0.000) 
  
0.9230 (0.000) 
  DealCAR Rescaled 
  
0.8050 (0.000) 
  
0.9270 (0.000) 
BidPremium four-week -0.0333 (0.000) -0.0400 (0.000) -0.0634 (0.000) -0.0766 (0.000) 
BidderSize 
    
0.0203 (0.000) 0.0242 (0.000) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 
    
0.0147 (0.650) 0.0161 (0.691) 
BidderLeverage 
    
0.0180 (0.143) 0.0151 (0.314) 
BidderMarketToBook 
    
-0.0015 (0.193) -0.0024 (0.090) 
BidderPastPerformance 
    
0.4210 (0.758) 0.9090 (0.592) 
TargetSize 
    
-0.0230 (0.000) -0.0266 (0.000) 
TargetMarketToBook 
    
0.0002 (0.866) 0.0006 (0.692) 
RelativeSize 
    
-0.0003 (0.969) -0.0016 (0.871) 
TenderOffer 
    
-0.0061 (0.388) 0.0030 (0.738) 
AllCash 
    
0.0081 (0.086) 0.0105 (0.078) 
AllStock 
    
0.0092 (0.024) 0.0146 (0.008) 
Toehold 
    
-0.0167 (0.376) -0.0364 (0.218) 
Hostile 
    
0.0024 (0.838) -0.0475 (0.022) 
Horizontal 
    
0.0033 (0.304) 0.0081 (0.047) 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
    
-0.0014 (0.298) -0.0016 (0.335) 
M&A activity index 
    
0.0000 (0.603) 0.0003 (0.020) 
_cons -0.0287 (0.000) -0.0342 (0.000) -0.0434 (0.000) -0.0582 (0.000) 
N 979   979   959   959   
adj. R-sq 61.20%   58.90%   72.30%   71.10%   
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Table 10 – Overbidding determinants – Descriptive statistics  
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics for variables used to study determinants of overbidding.  The M&A sample is 
a sub-sample of sample describe in Section 1.4 and Table 4, composed of 544 transactions for which we have been 
able to collect the necessary information. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Mean is the arithmetic average, 
Median the corresponding median, Stdev, the standard deviation of the mean and #Deals, the number of 
deals 
 
Variables Mean Median Stdev #Deals 
DealFOC -0.0546 -0.0555 0.0063 544 
BidderSize 14,663.76 4,380.57 38,296.47 544 
BidderStarAdv 0.4210 0.0000 0.4942 544 
TargetIndLiquidity 0.0806 0.0637 0.0820 544 
RelativeSize 0.3363 0.1226 0.6731 544 
Horizontal 0.5533 1.0000 0.4976 544 
Toehold 0.0276 0.0000 0.1639 544 
Hostile 0.0423 0.0000 0.2014 544 
Initiation 0.4099 0.0000 0.4923 544 
Negotiation 0.4632 0.0000 0.4991 544 
MultipleBidder 0.0588 0.0000 0.2785 544 
BidderPastPerformance 0.0005 0.0005 0.0013 544 
BidderVariableCompensation 0.8105 0.8479 0.1650 544 
Bidder GIM index 9.4577 9.0000 2.6458 544 
BidderFreeCashFlow 0.0530 0.0461 0.0638 544 
BidderLeverage 0.1560 0.1299 0.1324 544 
BidderCEO age 55.7721 56.0000 6.4325 544 
Bidder CEO tenure 7.8566 5.0000 7.4338 544 
Bidder CEO Pay slice 0.4004 0.4016 0.1235 544 
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Table 11 – Overbidding determinants – Multivariate analyses 
Table 11 summarizes multivariate analyses of overbidding determinants. The dependent variable, 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑂𝐶, is the 
degree of overbidding, obtained by estimating Equation (5). Column (1) reports results when limiting ourselves to 
independent variables of interest and column (2), results obtained when adding relevant control variables used to 
estimate the system of two simultaneous equations defined at Equations (3) and (4).  Standard-errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and reported between parentheses.  The M&A sample is described in Table 10. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 1. Coeff stands for coefficient and p-val for p-value. Adj-R-sq is the adjusted R square 
coefficient.  
 
 
(1) (2) 
 
DealFOC DealFOC 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderPastPerformance -0.7950 (0.000) -0.6480 (0.000) 
BidderVariableCompensation -0.0048 (0.044) -0.0041 (0.032) 
GIM index -0.0002 (0.094) -0.0002 (0.035) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 0.0006 (0.879) -0.0026 (0.451) 
BidderLeverage 0.0056 (0.003) 0.0038 (0.011) 
BidderCEO age 0.0042 (0.056) -0.0006 (0.767) 
Bidder CEO tenure 0.0000 (0.981) 0.0000 (0.852) 
Bidder CEO Pay slice 0.0050 (0.055) 0.0033 (0.101) 
BidderSize 
  
0.0001 (0.693) 
BidderStarAdv 
  
0.0005 (0.285) 
TargetIndLiquidity 
  
-0.0008 (0.820) 
RelativeSize 
  
-0.0003 (0.501) 
Horizontal 
  
-0.0018 (0.000) 
Toehold 
  
0.0065 (0.003) 
Hostile 
  
0.0165 (0.000) 
Initiation 
  
0.0013 (0.002) 
Negotiation 
  
0.0006 (0.186) 
MultipleBidder 
  
-0.0002 (0.865) 
_cons -0.0681 (0.000) -0.0501 (0.000) 
N 544 
 
544 
 adj. R-sq 0.058   0.392   
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Appendix 1 – Variable definitions 
Variable Definition  source 
52WeeksHigh target stock price on day minus 42 before the annoucement over the 
maximum target stock price observed during the 52 weeks before day 
minus 42 
crsp 
AllCash Dummy variable =1 if the consideration is cash only and 0 otherwise sdc 
AllStock Dummy variable =1 if the consideration is stock only and 0 otherwise sdc 
BidPremium 4 Weeks offer price divided by market price of the target  4 weeks before the 
announcement (computed by sdc) 
sdc 
BidPremium 8 Weeks offer price divided by market price of the target  42 days before the 
announcement (computed by authors) 
crsp,sdc 
BidderCAR Bidder CAR over the three days event windows centered on the 
annoucement date, estimated with a market model and with an 
estimation windows day minus 250 to day minus 10. CRSP value weighted 
index is used as proxy of the market index 
crsp,sdc 
BidderCAR$ BidderCAR multiplied by BidderSize crsp,sdc 
BidderCAR rescaled BidderCAR divided by Pr(Succes)Probit  
BidderCEO age Bidder CEO's age in year. Logarithm is used in the regression execucomp 
BidderCEO payslice Percentage of the bidder CEO's total pay (item TDC1) among the top five 
executives as in Bebchuck et al. (2011) 
execucomp 
BidderCEO tenure Bidder CEO's tenure: difference between the year of the deal and the year 
in which the CEO is appointed. Logarithm is used in the regression 
execucomp 
BidderFreeCashFlow Income before extraordinary items (compustat item IBC) divided by total 
assets (compustat item AT) 
compustat 
BidderIndCAR average DealCar in the sector (same SIC 2 digits) of the bidder during the 
year of the deal annoucement 
crsp,sdc 
BidderLeverage Long term debt (compustat item DLTT) divided by total assets (compustat 
item AT) 
compustat 
BidderMarketToBook Total assets minus common equity (compustat item CEQ) plus the market 
value of equity (compustat items CSHO*PRCC_F) divided by total assets 
(compustat item AT) 
compustat 
BidderPastPerformance Abnormal return (alpha) obtained form the estimation of the market 
model estimated during the period day minus 250 to day minus 20 
crsp,sdc 
BidderPrivateAmihud relative variation of the bidder Amihud(2002) illiquidity ratio between the 
pre (day minus 61 to day minus 42) and the post annoucement period 
(day plus 42 to day plus 61) 
crsp,sdc 
BidderPrivateR2 relative variation of the value of 1-R², obtained from the estimation of the 
market model, between the pre (day minus 61 to day minus 42) and the 
post annoucement period (day plus 42 to day plus 61) 
crsp,sdc 
BidderPrivateRoll relative variation of the covariance between bidder lagged return 
between the pre (day minus 61 to day minus 42) and the post 
announcement period (day plus 42 to day plus 61) 
crsp,sdc 
BidderSize market value of bidder 42 days before announcement (logarihm is used in 
the regression) 
crsp,sdc 
BidderStarAdv Dummy variable = 1 if the bidder is advised by one of the top-6 financial 
advisors, representing more than 70% of the total transaction values of 
M&A deals advised by the top-25 financial advisors during the entire 
period (1994-2007) and 0 otherwise. 
sdc 
BidderVariableCompensation Variable component of the bidder CEO's compensation : (item TDC1-item 
SALARY)/item TDC1 
execucomp 
BidPremium4w$ Bid Premium 4 weeks multiplied by TargetSize crps,sdc 
BidPremium8w$ Bid Premium 8 weeks multiplied by TargetSize crsp,sdc 
Deal success Dummy variable =1 if deal is successed and 0 otherwise sdc 
DealCAR weighted average of BidderCAR and TargetCAR  by market value 
computed in day minus 42 
crsp,sdc 
DealCAR Rescaled DealCAR divided by Pr(Succes)Probit  
DealCAR$ DealCAR multiplied by BidderSize plus TargetSize crsp,sdc 
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DealFOC First order condition estimated value for one deal (Equation (5)). 
Computation is based on the estimation of the system of Equations (3) 
and (4) 
crsp, compustat, sdc 
Bidder GIM index Bidder Gompers et al. (2003) governance index riskmetric 
Horizontal dummy variable = 1 if Bidder and target have the same sic code 4 digit, 0 
otherwise 
sdc 
Hostile dummy variable = 1 if the deal is classified hostile by sdc, 0 otherwise sdc 
Initiation dummy variable= 1 if the target initiated the deal, 0 otherwise. SEC fillings 
ListedBidder Dummy variable =1 if the bidder is a public firm, 0 otherwise sdc 
M&A activity index Schlingeman (2002) liquidity index. Ratio of the value of M&A 
transactions in a year to the total asset (item compustat AT) of firms in 
the two-digit SIC code for that year. 
sdc,compustat 
MultipleBidder Dummy variable=1 if the number of bidders reported in the SDC is greater 
than one, 0 otherwise 
sdc 
Negotiation Dummy variable = 1 if the selling procedure is a negotiation (if SEC filings 
indicates one buyer), 0 otherwise 
SEC fillings 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
the number of firms at least as large as the bidder in the bidder SIC 4-
digits industry 
compustat, sdc 
NyseAmex Dummy variable =1 if the bidder is quoted in Nyse or Amex 
stockexchange, 0 otherwise 
sdc 
PoisonPill Dummy variable = 1 if target has a poison pill (from sdc), 0 otherwise sdc 
Pr(Succes)Probit Fitted probability of success estimated from a probit model (Equation (6)) crsp,compustat,sdc 
Pr(Success)Bid Target CAR  divided by Bid Premium 4  weeks or Bid Premium 8 weeks 
both computed during the same period (4 weeks or 8 weeks before the 
annoucement date) ,rescaled between 0 and 1. 
crsp,sdc 
RelativeSize ratio of target market value computed on day minus 42 on bidder market 
value computed in day minus 42 
sdc 
TargetCAR target CAR over the three days event windows centered on the 
annoucement date, estimated with a market model and with an 
estimation windows day minus 250 to day minus 10 
crsp,sdc 
TargetIndCAR average DealCar in the sector (same SIC 2 digits) of the target during the 
year of the deal annoucement 
crps,sdc 
TargetMarketToBook Total assets minus common equity (item compustat CEQ) plus the market 
value of equity (item compustat CSHO*PRCC_F) divided by total assets 
(item compustat AT) 
compustat 
TargetRunup target stock performance during the period between day minus 42 and 
day minus 6 
crsp,sdc 
TargetSize target market value 42 days before announcement (logarithm is used in 
regression) 
crsp,sdc 
TenderOffer Dummy variable = 1 if the deal is classified as a tender offer by sdc, 0 
otherwise 
sdc 
Toehold Dummy variable = 1 if the bidder holds a non-zero percentage target's 
share before the annoucement, 0 otherwise 
sdc 
Turnover target average daily ratio of trading volume to total shares outstanding 
over the 52 weeks before the announcement  
crsp 
Year1990 dummy variable =1 if the deal is announced in the period 1990 to 1999 
(dummy), 0 otherwise 
sdc 
Year2000 dummy varaible = 1 if the deal is announced in the period 2000 to 2009 
(dummy), 0 otherwise 
sdc 
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Appendix 2  – Bidder’s expected profit maximization test – 2SLS Results 
 
Appendix 2 reproduces results displayed in Table 6 Panels A and B, using the 2SLS estimator in place of the the 
3SLS. 
 
Panel A - 𝐏𝐫�(𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔)𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒕 
  BidPremium four-week   BidPremium eight-week   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
BidderCAR Pr(Success)probit BidderCAR Pr(Success)probit 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderCAR 
  
0.0659 (0.031) 
  
0.0615 (0.042) 
DealCAR 0.8450 (0.000) 
  
0.8300 (0.000) 
  TargetRunup 
  
0.0502 (0.000) 
  
0.0292 (0.049) 
Pr(Succes)Probit 0.6660 (0.000) 
  
0.9510 (0.000) 
  Bid Premium -0.0625 (0.000) 0.0217 (0.005) -0.0602 (0.000) 0.0239 (0.004) 
BidderSize 0.0047 (0.004) 0.0043 (0.005) 0.0032 (0.125) 0.0044 (0.003) 
BidderStarAdv 
  
-0.0047 (0.335) 
  
-0.0051 (0.303) 
TargetIndLiquidity 
  
0.0013 (0.003) 
  
0.0014 (0.002) 
RelativeSize -0.0156 (0.000) 0.0016 (0.574) -0.0160 (0.000) 0.0018 (0.532) 
Horizontal -0.0169 (0.006) 0.0247 (0.000) -0.0239 (0.004) 0.0247 (0.000) 
AllStock -0.0160 (0.011) 0.0250 (0.000) -0.0211 (0.009) 0.0250 (0.000) 
Toehold 0.0594 (0.005) -0.1040 (0.000) 0.0863 (0.003) -0.1020 (0.000) 
Hostile 0.1580 (0.000) -0.2690 (0.000) 0.2260 (0.000) -0.2670 (0.000) 
BidderPrivateR2 0.0114 (0.382) -0.0247 (0.040) 0.0160 (0.320) -0.0241 (0.046) 
BidderPrivateAmihud 0.0112 (0.170) -0.0068 (0.393) 0.0137 (0.167) -0.0077 (0.330) 
BidderPrivateRoll -0.0003 (0.417) 0.0002 (0.565) -0.0003 (0.432) 0.0002 (0.598) 
Initiation 
  
-0.0085 (0.114) 
  
-0.0082 (0.129) 
Negotiation 
  
-0.0150 (0.005) 
  
-0.0158 (0.003) 
MultipleBidder -0.0104 (0.386) 0.0167 (0.149) -0.0273 (0.070) 0.0203 (0.078) 
_cons -0.6090 (0.000) 0.8150 (0.000) -0.8380 (0.000) 0.8130 (0.000) 
N 977 
 
977 
 
977 
 
977 
 FOC Test -0.0542       -0.0523       
F 51.4 (0.0000)     29.56 (0.0000)     
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 Panel B - 𝐏𝐫�  (𝑺𝒖𝒄𝒄𝒆𝒔)𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 
  BidPremium four-week   BidPremium eight-week   
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
BidderCAR Pr(Success)bid BidderCAR Pr(Success)bid* 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
BidderCAR 
  
0.0736 (0.048) 
  
0.1070 (0.021) 
DealCAR 0.8390 (0.000) 
  
0.8730 (0.000) 
  TargetRunup 
  
0.0103 (0.000) 
  
-0.0344 (0.130) 
Pr(Succes)Bid 0.5860 (0.203) 
  
-0.0015 (0.993) 
  BidPremium -0.0658 (0.000) 0.0392 (0.001) -0.0277 (0.000) 0.0041 (0.750) 
BidderSize 0.0043 (0.152) 0.0042 (0.010) 0.0075 (0.000) 0.0014 (0.550) 
BidderStarAdv 
  
0.0104 (0.734) 
  
-0.0069 (0.356) 
TargetIndLiquidity 
  
-0.0001 (0.583) 
  
-0.0001 (0.902) 
RelativeSize -0.0182 (0.000) 0.0049 (0.093) -0.0153 (0.000) -0.0033 (0.456) 
Horizontal 0.0079 (0.341) -0.0143 (0.021) 0.0003 (0.932) -0.0022 (0.757) 
AllStock 0.0071 (0.381) -0.0132 (0.064) 0.0006 (0.884) -0.0071 (0.357) 
Toehold -0.0201 (0.176) 0.0141 (0.360) -0.0160 (0.090) -0.0009 (0.962) 
Hostile 0.0012 (0.953) -0.0283 (0.193) -0.0217 (0.056) 0.0321 (0.122) 
BidderPrivateR2 -0.0049 (0.724) -0.0033 (0.942) -0.0103 (0.314) 0.0263 (0.155) 
BidderPrivateAmihud 0.0088 (0.349) -0.0049 (0.811) 0.0059 (0.386) 0.0167 (0.171) 
BidderPrivateRoll -0.0004 (0.304) 0.0005 (0.279) -0.0001 (0.568) -0.0007 (0.208) 
Initiation 
  
0.0021 (0.233) 
  
0.0031 (0.707) 
Negotiation 
  
0.0018 (0.169) 
  
-0.0157 (0.056) 
MultipleBidder 0.0037 (0.773) -0.0027 (0.757) -0.0035 (0.687) -0.0092 (0.602) 
_cons -0.4650 (0.129) 0.6700 (0.000) -0.0806 (0.304) 0.4450 (0.000) 
N 977 
 
977 
 
974 
 
974 
 FOC Test -0.0480       -0.0199       
F 12.79 (0.000)     25.62 (0.000)     
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Appendix 3  – Bidder’s bidding strategy test – eight-week bid premium 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled BidderCAR BidderCAR Rescaled 
  Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val 
DealCAR 0.8800 (0.000) 
  
0.9160 (0.000) 
  DealCAR Rescaled 
  
0.8680 (0.000) 
  
0.9110 (0.000) 
BidPremium eight-week -0.0168 (0.000) -0.0161 (0.000) -0.0310 (0.000) -0.0312 (0.000) 
BidderSize 
    
0.0145 (0.000) 0.0149 (0.000) 
BidderFreeCashFlow 
    
-0.0107 (0.551) -0.0118 (0.515) 
AcquierLeverage 
    
0.0136 (0.205) 0.0130 (0.237) 
BidderMarketToBook 
    
-0.0017 (0.041) -0.0018 (0.040) 
BidderPastPerformance 
    
-0.4080 (0.768) -0.4290 (0.759) 
TargetSize 
    
-0.0171 (0.000) -0.0174 (0.000) 
TargetMarketToBook 
    
0.0001 (0.928) 0.0001 (0.932) 
RelativeSize 
    
0.0137 (0.264) 0.0136 (0.270) 
TenderOffer 
    
-0.0062 (0.101) -0.0049 (0.215) 
AllCash 
    
0.0046 (0.102) 0.0044 (0.144) 
AllStock 
    
0.0042 (0.152) 0.0046 (0.133) 
Toehold 
    
-0.0063 (0.373) -0.0127 (0.105) 
Hostile 
    
-0.0160 (0.006) -0.0273 (0.000) 
Horizontal 
    
-0.0012 (0.629) -0.0009 (0.735) 
Number of large firms in 
industry 
    
-0.0014 (0.155) -0.0014 (0.162) 
M&A activity index 
    
-0.0028 (0.889) -0.0006 (0.977) 
_cons -0.0239 (0.000) -0.0240 (0.000) -0.0193 (0.089) -0.0206 (0.080) 
N 1,908   1,908   1,908   1,908   
adj. R-sq 64.30%   64.50%   70.90%   71.50%   
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